Eyewitness to war: The Ukrainian invasion of Russia

Ukrainian forces have crossed the Russian border in a surge of momentum, hoping to gain leverage with a high-stakes gamble.

Monument damaged after the Kursk offensive
A monument to Vladimir Lenin stands damaged amid hostilities on Aug. 16, 2024 in Sudzha, Russia. The fighting in Kursk Oblast began on Aug. 6, when the Ukrainian Armed Forces crossed the border and began to advance deep into Russian territory, and in a few days, took control of dozens of settlements in the Kursk region. © Getty Images
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In a nutshell

  • Ukraine’s Kursk offensive seeks to alter the strategic balance of the war
  • On the Ukrainian side, morale is high but operations are relatively unstructured
  • Russian resistance is virtually absent, leaving civilians fleeing and disoriented

This ground-level eyewitness assessment of events at the very edge of the Russian front is not intended to shed any special light on strategic questions, merely to report operational matters as they stand currently. Generalities may be gleaned from these particulars – primarily in understanding the ineffable yet crucial “spirit” of a battlefield – that distillation of morale, ambition and resolve that can make or break a fighting force.

Ukraine’s Kursk salient has many in the West puzzled, not only due to the surprise, but also because of the ambiguous strategic objectives of the offensive itself. It is not only allies who are left wondering. Russian command staff is clearly reeling from recent events, large swaths of affected Russian civilians are stunned and confused, and the Ukrainian rank-and-file itself is attempting to place events into some kind of coherent context. Like a wrestler losing ground incrementally to a larger opponent and suddenly shifting his hold, Ukraine’s Kursk breakout is primarily intended to alter an unfavorable balance – to seek a reconfiguration that may present opportunities for new leverage points. In short, it is very much a gamble; unknown possible future gains are balanced against the inevitable and unsustainable losses of the status quo.

Enthusiasm and spontaneous initiatives

The most obvious feature in the current cross-border dynamic is the sheer energy on display. Traffic is intense on Highway H07 from Sumy to the Russian border, with some 200-300 vehicles per hour entering Russian territory. This high-speed one-way flow (primarily, but not exclusively, armored traffic) creates a pall of dust leading through wrecked former border checkpoints. The Ukrainian mood is of barely concealed excitement verging on giddiness. The enthusiasm is infectious, and operations are conducted amid a general melee of competing units vying for the chance to “get in and fight.” This sense of opportunity attracts a disproportionate share of aggressive elements, many of whom eagerly engage in their own self-described “pirate” operations in the general free-for-all. This is not to suggest the Ukrainian command has no plans or organization – only that a generalized eagerness to take the fight to the Russians pervades every one of the frontline units contacted.

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Facts & figures

The Kursk offensive

These units are especially hungry for men: Members of our team were zealously invited to join various pop-up missions, as units vie for the manpower needed to advance to choice target sectors. The atmosphere is almost party-like – enthusiasm and spontaneous initiative are on vibrant display everywhere, from back shop repair facilities to the gas stations that act as social centers and last-minute supply depots.

Whether this palpable fervor is being channeled effectively or merely represents unfocused effort is difficult to tell. It is evident that the initiative has been taken not only by Ukrainian general staff but by the military command structure as a whole. To be sure, this frenzy has attracted its share of cranks and misfits. Some of these, active since the early days of Donbas fighting more than a decade ago, have come eagerly to the front to engage in mayhem – they are nominally under military command, but engage in a certain amount of unit-hopping from command to command, seeking opportunities for fighting and adrenaline. It is a strangely ill-disciplined lot, but they constitute a significant share of fierce frontline initiative and therefore seem to be tolerated by the Ukrainian command structures.

Well-equipped and competent force

The mechanics of the offensive are worth noting in some detail. We were presented, for instance, with footage (shown with a great deal of relish) from the initial hours leading to the border assault, a video that showed advance reconnaissance and assault units posing as members of the Akhmat (Russian Chechen) Battalion, tasked with secondary border security near Sudzha. Ukrainian units used captured uniforms and weapons, even inking on false beards with black markers to complete the subterfuge. Their surprise storm tactics were then followed up with armored assaults which led to the famous capitulation scenes telegraphed around the globe the following morning. The surprise seems indeed to have been complete.

In current operations, we noted relatively little heavy armor mobilizing toward Russian territory. Instead, the preponderance of traffic consists of medium and light armor vehicles: American Humvees, Ukrainian Dozor-Bs, British Ocelots, Australian Bushmasters, and the like. A constellation of informally military-fitted civilian trucks acts as a ubiquitous transport chain, and most are unarmored to be more agile and avoid the heavy beating of rough roads. The majority of all vehicles entering Russia are relatively new and in good to excellent condition – complete with the proper logistical support in place for maintenance, repairs and servicing. The overarching sense is of a well-equipped, competent force fully in possession of its mission and means.

Supporting fire (we witnessed launches of HIMARS or equivalent) and heavy artillery (155 mm) appear to be fired mostly from within Ukrainian territory, though frontline deployment is evident as well. The communications/jamming environment appears to be fully saturated: Nearly all vehicles have mounted jamming units, and (at least) the Iridium satellite bandwidths seem fully disabled, most probably to counter GPS-guided munitions. 

We witnessed only one returning medical evacuation vehicle in 24 hours, indicating either substantial frontline medical facilities (which is doubtful) or low casualties. We received direct reports of one American volunteer killed in action in Kursk (one of a number of long-serving foreign volunteers), but overall, there seem to be relatively few operational casualties.

No evidence of resistance

If the Ukrainian side of the border is something almost festive, the Russian side is a vacuum. The evacuation of civilians is almost complete, with only a few straggling citizens remaining, and those generally elderly. The former border checkpoints are heaps of twisted metal and pulverized masonry. No evidence of organized resistance to the Ukrainian incursion is at all visible.

Having witnessed the Ukrainian resistance in Irpin and Bucha while they still smoldered from Russian occupation, the difference could hardly be more stark. Evidence of fierce Ukrainian resistance was everywhere in 2022: crates of Molotov cocktails on street corners, invective-laced messages scrawled on storefronts and spent shell casings piled behind makeshift barriers built against the intruders. 

In Russia, it is entirely different. Citizens fled the Ukrainian advance without resisting, leaving homes and possessions entirely undefended. I documented only one makeshift roadblock, consisting of a pile of chairs and a few garden implements, and no formal efforts seem to have been made to resist the Ukrainian advance.

Of the handful of remaining civilians, some are eager to chat (in Ukrainian!) with the occupiers. We spoke to one woman, clearly dazed from the abrupt changes, who believed that the Ukrainian and Russian militaries were in collusion and only wished to steal her village’s scarce resources. She turned down an offer of Ukrainian cash, asking us bitterly, “Where will I spend that?” 

The rest of the left-behind civilians are furtive. It appears that some have engaged in relatively systematic, if low-grade, looting of their former neighbors’ homes. Crudely broken door locks, pilfered basement stores, and petty stolen items like obsolete computer hard drives indicate that some who have stayed behind have taken advantage (through necessity or opportunism) of the freshly vacated town.

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The Ukrainians, for their part, have moved through these towns leaving things essentially untouched and unoccupied on their way to the expanding frontline. They leave only the invasion symbol of an inverted triangle to mark buildings and vehicles as “cleared.” This light touch is not due to any kind of military authority, for there is none – little if any in the way of civil, military or police authority has been deployed. Rather, the lack of Ukrainian interest in pilfering (beyond a few symbolic trophies like license plates) stems from their undisguised disgust at the Russians’ poverty. Toilets, washing machines, even unlocked motorcycles have no allure for the comparatively wealthy Ukrainian soldiers, who sneer at the shabby material possessions of their erstwhile conquerors.

All in all, the situation is extraordinarily fluid, almost spontaneous in nature. Ukrainian forces are in the heady throes of taking the initiative, for better and worse, and have yet to fully consolidate their surprising advance. The difference in spirit between the opposing sides is stark – a fact that may hold strategic significance as the conflict rolls on.

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Scenarios

Least likely: Ukraine will dig in for a long-term occupation

Contrary to murmurs (on both sides of the border) of a restoration of historical Ukrainian territories like the “Sloboda Ukraine” (Free Borderland), this seems exceedingly unlikely. Ukraine simply does not have the will or capacity for anything like a long-term territorial annexation. 

More likely: Ukraine will use some of the gained territory for eventual bargaining, but not under the current configuration

Supply lines are too far stretched and defensive manning is too thin to establish a significant beachhead for a winter campaign under withering KAB-500 glide-bomb bombardment. Rather, Ukraine will likely soon initiate a strategic withdrawal, perhaps to the Seym River near Rylsk, or the Psel River near Sudzha, where they can dig in and defend token captured Russian territory to use as bargaining material, while redirecting forces toward Russia’s Pokrovsk salient in the Donbas and operations in Crimea.

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