Central Europe asks NATO to help defend the eastern flank from Russia
The hybrid forms of aggression Russia exerts on NATO members in Central Europe are just a notch below the threshold of outright war.
In a nutshell
- Russia has been escalating its hybrid-war pressure on Central Europe
- The campaign is most pronounced in the Baltics and along Poland’s border
- NATO’s eastern-flank governments see the need for all-alliance action
A second cold war against the West is intensifying in Europe. Russia launched it by annexing Crimea in 2014 and following up with a full-scale armed invasion of Ukraine, a strategic partner of NATO and the European Union, in February 2022.
In its essence, this cold war is similar to the first one in the 20th century. It is a confrontation between nuclear powers that are capable of destroying each other. The contest takes place below the threshold of open war, using the threat of nuclear Armageddon as an essential blackmail instrument. However, the current variety of cold war differs from its predecessor, as it employs a bigger toolbox of activities that are often referred to as “hybrid” or in the gray zone. Therefore, this second cold war can also be called a hybrid cold war.
The primary source of risk that this cold war may turn into a hot one between Russia and the West is the bloodletting in Ukraine, which, apart from the direct struggles between Russian and Ukrainian troops, is also a proxy war between Russia and the West. NATO participates in the conflict indirectly, supporting Ukraine.
Subliminal aggression and other hybrid-war tricks
Just like the 20th century East-West wars in Korea and Vietnam, the war in Ukraine has a direct and consequential impact on the entire global security environment, generating hybrid campaigns of Russian-Western confrontation. These second cold war campaigns take the form of non-kinetic pressure and kinetic subliminal aggression. (See: “Cognitive Warfare, a Battle for the Brain,” published by NATO Defense College).
Non-kinetic hybrid modes of operation are primarily in the realm of information, including disinformation operations and sabotage in cyberspace; relentless political pressure including diplomatic campaigns; espionage and so-called influence operations; weaponizing migration; military blackmail (also related to nuclear weapons); and provocations of various kinds. All these operations are intended to manipulate the targeted government and society indirectly, that is, influence its cognitive, evaluative and decision-making processes so that the actions of the targeted country are consistent with the goals of the attacking party. Such activities are also called cognitive warfare. This is a classic tool of the art of war according to the ancient theoretician and philosopher of war, Sun Tzu.
There has been a noticeable escalation in hybrid activity on the eastern flank of NATO and the EU.
Kinetic hybrid operations are the next step of war: They lead to physical destruction in the attacked countries and intimidation of their societies – but are still below the threshold of open armed aggression. It is a hidden, camouflaged “false flag” use of the aggressor’s combat resources or local accomplices to carry out acts of sabotage (such as setting fire to large facilities, disrupting transport and communications) and terrorist activities intended to cause public panic, “soften” the targeted country’s authorities and force decisions desired by the aggressor.
Kinetic hybrid operations can be conducted by agents of secret services or special forces, non-state mercenaries, private military contractors or recruited local criminals (“black and gray men”).
Facts & figures
The cold war of the 21st century
Ominous escalation against Poland
Recently, there has been a noticeable escalation in hybrid activity on the eastern flank of NATO and the EU: a shift from non-kinetic pressure to kinetic aggression. Migratory pressure on the Polish-Belarusian border has been an element of Russia’s campaign – with the participation of Belarus – against Poland for several years. When, as recently, shadow operators sent to the border from the east begin physical attacks, injuring and killing a soldier, we are no longer talking about “pressure” but about covert aggression.
Border attacks combined with acts of espionage, increasingly intense cyberattacks and acts of sabotage in entire countries show that Russia is targeting Poland and other NATO and EU border countries as objects of its subliminal war. The Kremlin likely hopes that, given the lack of a unified approach to these issues in NATO and the EU, the eastern flank countries will be left alone in trying to respond to this type of aggression.
Read more on NATO and the war in Ukraine
- Assessing Europe’s potential to defend itself
- Military context of the Belarusian crisis
- Putin’s next gamble in Ukraine
- The Visegrad Group and Europe’s security system: a story to watch
We are dealing with a situation where consensus is elusive and alliance member states located further from Russia feel less threatened by this form of cold war, making them reluctant to support a determined NATO response. The Kremlin, well aware of this, is making the most of the situation and escalating the confrontation.
The East Shield and Baltic Defense Line
In the face of this unrelenting pressure, Poland has decided to launch an extensive, four-year defense initiative called East Shield (Tarcza Wschód) to enhance security in the border zone with Belarus and Russia (Kaliningrad Oblast). The program is intended to strengthen the current anti-hybrid defenses in the area and prepare the country to repel possible armed aggression from the east in a direct confrontation at the border.
The East Shield program consists of several elements: building operational and tactical situational awareness capabilities (radio-electronic and air reconnaissance networks with drones and advanced military surveillance systems); engineering development of the area in such a way as to impede the possible advance of enemy troops while facilitating the maneuver of own forces; and ensuring protection of soldiers and civilians against attacks.
Only an effectively overpowered and weakened enemy can get stuck in defensive fortifications.
Other countries on NATO’s northeastern flank are coming to similar conclusions, as their concerns about the threat from Russia continue to grow. Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia are planning to expand the Baltic Defense Line. Finland, long known for thorough preparations to defend its territory, intends to renovate and adapt former fortifications along its border with Russia. In this way, the countries on the northeastern flank, by improving their defenses, contribute to the security of NATO, the EU and the West as a whole.
Successful defense requires active components
Defense consists not only of resistance but also of striking the opponent. In order to be effective, defensive undertakings must be tightly integrated with other strategic activities, such as general and technical intelligence, satellite and air monitoring and air defense (including anti-missile, anti-aircraft, anti-drone access zones actively deployed far ahead of the land defense frontier). These elements need to be supported by the ability to deliver strikes from long-range precision weapons against an aggressor’s troops throughout the entire depth and width of the theater.
Only an effectively overpowered and weakened enemy can get stuck in defensive fortifications. Without this, the attacking force will retain the initiative in choosing the time, place and the mix of forces, ensuring an advantage in the initial phase of a war.
Such a reality strongly advocates for the adoption and execution of a preemptive defense strategy at the beginning of a war – including preemptive attacks on the adversary’s troops when they set out to attack, not only once they initiate it. Modern surveillance capabilities make detection, assessment and decision-making much more reliable than was previously possible.
The snag: NATO’s lack of unity
The strategy depicted above should be a doctrine of the entire alliance, not of individual frontline states. And here is the pitfall. Strategically justified as it may be, both from the point of view of its deterrent and defensive effectiveness, such a strategy is unlikely to be swiftly adopted by allied states, even at the upcoming summit in Washington (July 9-12, 2024). The diverse political attitudes among the alliance members – visible, for example, in the context of supporting Ukraine in its defensive war against Russia – do not bode well for the likelihood of the eastern flank countries’ approach being adopted as a common doctrine.
This situation somehow suspends, in a vacuum, the political declaration of the 2023 NATO Vilnius summit about defending “every inch” of the alliance’s territory and questions the overall credibility of Article 5, that if one ally is attacked, it will be considered an attack against all. This lack of cohesiveness also reduces the potential strategic effectiveness of the defense initiatives of the frontline states in this second cold war. If the Polish East Shield and the Baltic Defense Line are not supported by the threat of preemptive strikes by the allies, they may share the fate of countless failed defense lines throughout history – from the Great Wall of China to the Maginot Line.
Proposals from Poland and others in Central Europe
For this reason, the countries of NATO’s northeastern flank are striving for the greatest possible internationalization and EU-backing for their defense initiatives to deter hybrid-warfare attacks. Poland, for example, is counting on Frontex, the European Border and Coast Guard Agency, to be involved to a large extent in securing its border with Belarus as the EU’s eastern external border. It is also hoping for solidarity and more foresight from other European countries; that they will deploy their forces on the first line of anti-hybrid defense. Warsaw is also undertaking steps and diplomatic efforts to ensure defense investments along the border zone will be co-financed from common EU funds.
An urgent and crucial element of this adaptation is the appropriate strengthening of the eastern flank against hybrid attacks – including defenses against subliminal aggression.
Warsaw insists that, as an urgent necessity, both the Polish East Shield and the initiatives of the Baltic countries should be reviewed at the next alliance summit and accepted as allied tasks, implemented with the participation of member states and within alliance structures. In the context of ongoing anti-hybrid defense, a review of the rules and procedures is necessary to identify how the existing operational plans must be updated and enhanced to counter emerging risks.
The challenge before NATO and the EU today is adapting to the rapidly changing security environment, including the challenges and threats generated by the policy of an imperialistic Russia. An urgent and crucial element of this adaptation is the appropriate strengthening of the eastern flank against hybrid attacks – including defenses against subliminal aggression. It will subsequently be critically important to adjust NATO’s deterrence and defense capabilities to fit any outcome of the war in Ukraine (Russian victory, Ukrainian victory, permanent war or frozen conflict).
These measures are most strongly considered as fundamental security needs by the frontline states of Russia’s second cold war with the West, and they are taking critical initiatives in this regard. However, will NATO and the EU as a whole be able to conduct this necessary adaptation strategically, proactively in advance of expected needs – or will we continue to react only operationally, with a delay (as with support for Ukraine), in response to Russia’s next escalatory provocations?
Scenarios
From the perspective of the approaching Washington summit, three possible scenarios emerge: tactical, operational and strategic.
Likely: Operational scenario, limited action
The operational scenario involves addressing some of the challenges and considering the initiatives put forth by the eastern flank states to define required steps to shore up NATO’s current hybrid warfare defenses, including defense against subliminal aggression. This may include reviewing procedures, revising doctrines and updating operational plans and exercise programs through a counter-hybrid lens.
Possible: Tactical scenario, business as usual
If the eastern flank countries take the initiative, the alliance as a whole will let the border states implement their strategic plans. The alliance will recognize their vigilance, including explicit mention of them in the summit’s closing declaration, and offer limited assistance. As for a more substantial commitment, allied countries will consider how to cooperate and to what degree, and some may even prepare contingency plans, but will wait for implementation.
Least likely: Comprehensive strategic update
The strategic scenario consists of launching the work on the doctrine of containment and defense, taking into account the concept of preemptive defense as the only real means of ensuring the implementation of the political declaration of defense of every inch of the alliance’s territory. This scenario is desirable for the member countries currently under greatest pressure from Russia, but at the same time, it is probably the least likely of all three scenarios.
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