The Russian strategy in the Mediterranean
Russia’s influence around the Mediterranean Sea has fluctuated over the years. Recent efforts to flex its muscles in the region are going largely unchallenged.
In a nutshell
- Russian attention in the Mediterranean has shifted to Libya
- Moscow sees its Africa strategy as way to counter Western pressure
- Western countries appear unwilling to slow Russia’s Mediterranean expansion
Russia has never possessed a Mediterranean fleet. Even on paper, its geopolitical strategy has always been continental and, at best, aimed at the northern seas and oceans. Control over the Mediterranean Sea has often appeared too far out of reach.
Russia’s physical presence has been limited to a Mediterranean squadron, the Fifth Eskadra, which has been there since 1958, following the U.S. intervention in Lebanon. While it has sought to promote Moscow’s interests and to influence relations with regional actors, its primary purpose was establishing a naval contingent capable of rapid intervention in the Black Sea (with the caveat of the 1936 Montreaux Convention, which gave Turkey control of the sea’s gateway straits).
Russia’s historical interests
As the scholars Lyle J. Goldstein and Yuri Zhukov wrote in 2004, “the Mediterranean and Black Seas were historically regarded by many Russian elites as constituting a single body of water. As the preeminent Black Sea power, then, the Soviet Union was compelled to extend its weight into the adjoining waters.” In 1959, Admiral Ivan Kasatonov (who later became commander of the Black Sea Fleet in the early 1990s) gave a speech to the crew of a submarine in Vlore, Albania, during the first extended deployment of the Soviet Navy in the Mediterranean, arguing that even his sailors fully understood the importance of a naval presence in this maritime domain.
Ivan Kapitanets, another admiral – and Fifth Eskadra’s chief of staff from 1970 to 1973 – stated that a naval presence was necessary to defend the interests of the motherland. Both officers were echoing the doctrinal idea of the principal Soviet naval leader of the era, Admiral of the Fleet Sergey Gorshkov, whose concepts of strategic mobility and forward deployment shaped the Soviet presence in the Mediterranean.
Such aspirations were put into practice through a series of Cold War-era agreements with countries bordering the Mediterranean. In 1958, in fact, Albania opened the port of Vlore to Soviet submarines, expanding Russian reach into the Adriatic. But the arrangement did not last long and by 1961 the Soviet port was closed. The combined number of days spent by all Soviet ships in the Mediterranean dropped from 5,600 days in 1960 to 2,300 in 1961, and 600 in 1963. After supporting the Arab cause in the 1967 war against Israel, the Soviets gained access to ports in Alexandria, Marsa Matruh and Port Said in Egypt, and Latakia in Syria. By 1971 the USSR presence had expanded by 300 percent thanks to this new access.
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However, this would also wane as relations with Cairo soured under Egyptian President Anwar Sadat, who was even refused access to the port of Marsa Matruh when Russian vessels were there. The Soviets lost the Egyptian ports definitively in 1976. In Syria, they expanded to Tartus with a presence that endures to this day. But the Syrian ports were then and remain small, ill-equipped and unsuitable for large ships or to support the extended operations of the Russian Navy.
All of these moves came under the close observation of the U.S. – which has (unlike Russia) always had a stable presence in the Mediterranean through the U.S. Sixth Fleet, thanks in part to various port bases such as La Maddalena and Naples in Italy, Rota in Spain and Crete in Greece.
Doorway to the Sahel, port to the Mediterranean
As Moscow-Cairo ties declined with the drift of Egypt into the U.S. camp, Russian attention shifted to Libya. Increasingly from 2008 onward, the Kremlin has signed billion-dollar contracts for arms supplies and for railway projects (still unbuilt) of more than 550 kilometers between Sirte and Benghazi, two strategic cities overlooking the Mediterranean Sea.
Back then, Libyan dictator Muammar Qaddafi offered then-Russian President Dmitry Medvedev the port of Benghazi as a permanent Russian base, as a counterbalance toward the U.S. But it was the Kremlin that clearly accumulated the most substantial benefits, as a permanent North Africa/Mediterranean forward base resolved the problems associated with lengthy out-of-area deployments and maintained “the option of crisis involvement.”
Despite the 2011 overthrow of the Qaddafi regime, Russia has not taken its eyes off of Libya. This is evidenced by its excellent relations with the current Eastern Libyan leadership, which often flies to Moscow or hosts prominent figures linked to Russian President Vladimir Putin.
The ultimate goal, apart from economic benefits related to circumventing sanctions over the Ukraine invasion, is apparently to open a Russian front on the Mediterranean, owing precisely to Libya’s strategic position. Shipments of armaments from the port of Tartus in Syria to the one in Tobruk are increasing, and the Russian physical presence has reportedly grown to around 1,800 men, distributed in military bases like al-Kharouba/al-Khadim, Jufra and Tobruk. Mercenaries – possibly belonging to the so-called Africa Corps, a Russian government-run revival of the Wagner paramilitary group – have been seen in the towns of Ghardabiya and al-Marj. Some observers have reported that a training camp is being set up in the vicinity of Benghazi.
Russia seeks a stable base in Libya for several reasons: Its ships could dock in front of European shores, while airfields would allow the placement of Russian air weapon systems. The most potentially disruptive factor concerns new warfare technologies. A few squadrons of drones, perhaps even Iranian ones, would be enough to agitate the waters of the entire Mediterranean; the Shahed-136, for example, known as Geranium in Russia, has a maximum range of 2,500 kilometers.
But an important distinction should be made. If the Russian intent is to threaten NATO with any of these capabilities, this creates far more risk for Russia than for the Western alliance, as NATO forces would likely make short work of Russian operations. If, as is more likely, these capabilities are intended to support Russian allies in North Africa and elsewhere on the African continent, that is a different matter.
Circumventing sanctions
Recent months have also put a spotlight on Russian efforts to skirt Ukraine-related oil sanctions by selling it through Libya. The proceeds since 2022 have amounted to some $5 billion, flowing to Russia with the blessing of Libyan Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar. This helps explain why Moscow, after more than two years of sanctions and isolation, has not yet collapsed.
It also shows that dwelling only on Russian activities in the Mediterranean can be limiting. Its strategy should be interpreted by also looking more broadly at the entire African continent, as well as all the countries that are newly falling into Russia’s orbit. The latest is Niger, which until last year was a major U.S. ally and where a $100 million military base was built, allowing drones to depart for reconnaissance (and targeted military operations) across the Sahel. That base is now in danger of coming under Moscow’s control, as are some ports in Sudan, which are crucial for direct access to the Red Sea. Having an outpost in that area would give Moscow significant strategic advantages and create another headache for the U.S. Navy, alongside a Red Sea already in turmoil over the Somalis, Yemenis and Iranians.
These examples provide a bellwether of Russia’s potential on a continent where sanctions and demands from the international community, primarily the United Nations, struggle to be enforced, and where local sentiments about the Russia-Ukraine war vary substantially from those in the U.S. and Europe. These are details that the Kremlin has not missed, and, starting precisely with Libya, it is largely taking advantage of them.
Scenarios
Russia is successfully circumventing sanctions over its invasion of Ukraine, which have so far had a limited impact on the war. Seizing on this, the Kremlin is pushing its own people – whether politicians, professional soldiers or private military contractors – to the African coasts bordering the Mediterranean and to numerous countries below the Maghreb, in a kind of pincer maneuver. Meanwhile, the West seems to be missing in action.
Very unlikely: Russian expansion in the Mediterranean is throttled by Europe and the U.S.
In an almost unthinkable scenario given current trends, the West reacts strongly to Russia’s growing presence along the Mediterranean in Africa, making it hard for Moscow to capitalize on it. Russian attempts to disseminate propaganda and influence, control key resources and take advantage of migration flows would be challenged. Moscow would be unable to get a grip on the maritime chessboard of the Mediterranean and the Red Sea.
Most likely: Russia moves forward in the Mediterranean
In all likelihood, Russia will gain a greater foothold in the Mediterranean, as well as the Red Sea, thanks to Western unwillingness to stand in its way. Western countries do not appear ready to impose themselves in Africa to limit Russia’s advance, and are failing to implement a containment strategy in states such as Libya, which are decisive for the trafficking of arms, oil, rare materials and migrants from the Sahel. France – which until recently held a leadership role in the Sahel – has had to abandon the entire region. This was also the case with the European EUCAP mission, while the U.S. military mission is facing great difficulties, as noted recently by AFRICOM commander General Michael Langley. In addition, American interest seems to be shifting more toward China than Russia, the latter being seen as a lower-level competitor. While that may be true in absolute terms, the Kremlin can nevertheless do a lot of damage, as was clear in Libya between 2019 and 2020. This prospect should not be underestimated.
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