Philippine statecraft navigates Chinese aggression and the U.S. alliance
The U.S.-Philippines defense pact has gained renewed attention amid rising tensions in the South China Sea.
In a nutshell
- Marcos emphasizes peaceful resolution for SCS disputes with China
- Philippine-U.S. security relations have improved markedly under Marcos
- Manila’s role in U.S. activities around Taiwan remains an open question
The defense relationship between the Philippines and the United States has come back into the spotlight as China has repeatedly clashed with the Southeast Asian nation in the South China Sea (SCS) in recent months. Additionally, there has been speculation as to whether Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos, Jr. would activate the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA), one of Manila’s bilateral defense pacts with Washington, in relation to the defense of Taiwan. Namely, would the Philippines support the U.S. if a military response became necessary in the event that Beijing seeks to take Taiwan by force?
Philippine and Chinese ‘lines’ in the South China Sea
Under a 1951 mutual defense treaty, Manila and Washington are required to provide each other military assistance in the event of an armed attack by a third country. This could include Chinese assaults on Philippine coast guard ships. Chinese vessels have confronted and violently engaged Philippine ships multiple times this spring and summer.
At an April meeting in Washington, D.C., with President Marcos and Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida, U.S. President Joe Biden affirmed his “ironclad” support for the treaty with the Philippines, including the protection of its coast guard, underscoring the U.S. position on regional security.
Serious concerns over a possible Philippine invocation of this treaty arose in June when tensions in the South China Sea were triggered by China’s enforcement of its 2021 Law on the Coast Guard for the arrest and detention of foreign nationals it considers to be illegally trespassing on Beijing’s sovereign claims. President Marcos criticized new enforcement of the regulation as being “escalatory” and “different” from anything Beijing had previously imposed in the region. He went on further to warn that a “red line” would be crossed if a Filipino citizen was killed because of the escalating tensions. He described the most recent flare-ups as being very close to “an act of war.”
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Beijing asserts territorial rights to 90 percent of the South China Sea area, under a maritime claim it refers to as the “nine-dash line,” though the claims are not supported by international law. Several hundred islands and reefs falling within this area are located in the Philippines’ maritime Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). These zones were defined and ratified as part of the Third United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which dates back to 1982, came into force in 1994 and forms the basis of maritime sovereignty worldwide. China is a party to the agreement.
In 2016, a Hague Tribunal initiated by Manila under the auspices of the UNCLOS found in favor of the Philippines in exercising jurisdiction over the waters and land within its EEZ. Beijing, however, ignores the ruling.
During a violent encounter involving Chinese and Philippine vessels, on June 17 a Filipino naval serviceman was wounded in an “intentional high-speed ramming” by a Chinese boat. The confrontation also involved Chinese mariners wielding axes and knives while seizing several Philippine navy rifles. China most recently engaged in a ramming event against a Philippine Coast Guard vessel in mid-August.
Actions and reactions
Despite this overt Chinese aggression, President Marcos has not classified such incidents as having crossed a red line that would lead Manila and Washington to act on their treaty obligations. The U.S. State Department accuses China of “dangerous and irresponsible actions to deny the Philippines from executing a lawful maritime operation in the South China Sea.” Nevertheless, President Marcos has repeatedly stated that he would seek peaceful means of resolving conflicts in the SCS and did not seek to escalate the situation into war.
In line with this goal, President Marcos has opened new channels of high-level communication with Beijing, and presidential hotlines will be used to avert confrontations at sea from spiraling out of control.
On July 21, the Philippines and China provisionally agreed to regular resupply missions of Philippine troops stationed in a grounded vessel on the Second Thomas Shoal, the epicenter of the violent incidents in June. Both sides have also formally agreed to de-escalate and manage their differences through dialogue and consultation, mainly as a result of the initiatives that President Marcos put to Beijing.
U.S.-Philippines cooperation on broader security issues
While President Marcos continues with peacemaking efforts, Washington has called for a new set of regional and broader security measures to be discussed with Manila. The ministerial consultations held in Manila on July 30 were in the form of a 2+2 arrangement, involving their respective defense and foreign secretaries.
Notably, it was only the fourth occasion this 2+2 format had been initiated since 2012 when it was first tabled. On the latest occasion, both sides discussed enhancing commitments toward their mutual alliance, including “support of the rules-based international order, enhanced economic ties, broad-based prosperity and solutions to evolving regional and global security challenges.” They also agreed that the U.S. would provide $500 million to Manila for security measures, bolstered bilateral agreements and announced the 2+2 consultations will henceforth be held annually, with the next meeting to occur in 2025 in Washington.
Oscillations in Philippine foreign policy and defense cooperation
Security and political ties between the Philippines and U.S. have greatly improved since President Marcos came to office in 2022. During that time, the U.S. has gained access to four additional military sites under the EDCA.
The program faced significant political pushback before coming into existence. Its launch in 2014 and expansion in 2023 depended on the support of U.S.-leaning Philippine presidents. A challenge to the relationship came primarily with President Rodrigo Duterte, Mr. Marcos’ predecessor, who moved Manila away from traditional and singularly close-knit ties with Washington in an effort to nurture relations with Beijing and Moscow.
Closer ties with Beijing were first launched under the 2001-2010 presidency of Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo – a period both the Philippine and Chinese governments referred to as “the Golden Age.” Although Ms. Arroyo adhered to the status quo in security links with the U.S., her principal goal in cultivating warmer relations with China was an economic one.
The subsequent Philippine government of 2010-2016, under President Benigno Aquino III, orchestrated much closer defense cooperation with the U.S. This included establishing the first EDCA program. It contained five military bases and allowed for hosting rotations of American troops, all of which were positioned in the southern and central regions of the country.
The primary purpose was to support the Philippine military in internal operations, including countering Islamic insurgencies and terrorism, which was especially prevalent in the southernmost islands of Mindanao and Jolo. While negotiating the EDCA with Washington, Mr. Aquino also filed the SCS arbitration with the Hague Tribunal.
In contrast, the 2016-2022 administration of President Duterte stunned the world with an unprecedented pivot away from Washington. The firebrand president called for a modernization of the Philippine armed forces in deals with Russia and China, eventually signing an agreement with Moscow for defense and technical cooperation.
President Duterte also looked to scrap the Philippines-U.S. 1998 Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA), for which the EDCA was the executive implementation platform. Although the EDCA not itself scrapped, President Duterte delayed its launch until near the end of his term, when he pulled out from terminating the VFA.
President Duterte’s strategy to court Beijing largely failed. Chinese provocations continued and promised investment into the Philippines was not forthcoming. Toward the end of his term in office, he sought to initiate a restoration of traditional relations with the U.S., though elections were highlighted by uncertainty.
Marcos Jr. goes to Washington
At the outset of President Marcos’ administration in 2022, there was speculation as to whether the new president would pursue his predecessor’s initial gambit of closer relations with China. Both were from the same political party, while President Marcos’ Vice President, Sara Duterte, is the former president’s daughter.
Yet what transpired was quite different. Within a few months of coming to power, President Marcos set about realigning military ties with Washington, becoming the first Philippine president to visit the U.S. capital in 10 years.
He also proposed the establishment of four additional EDCA bases. Unlike the original set of bases, the new installations would be mainly located in the northern part of the country, including Camilo Osias Naval Base and Lal-lo Airbase in the coastal province of Cagayan, facing the island of Taiwan, while Camp Melchor Dela Cruz would be situated in the inland northern province of Isabela. In effect, three of the four new bases are therefore in geographically strategic positions, close to Taiwan. That would enable U.S. forces stationed there to react early in the event of a potential Beijing invasion of the self-ruled island.
Only one of the four new bases, on Balabac Island in Palawan, is located in the SCS. However, it is without any infrastructure capable of supporting much military activity in the region. That feeds speculation whether it was merely a token gesture by the U.S. to placate anti-American sentiments in the Philippines – especially the plethora of nationalist lobby groups – regarding the placement of the other three bases.
Given the locations of most new bases, alongside recent large-scale “Balikatan” (meaning “shoulder-to-shoulder” in Tagalog) U.S.-Philippines military exercises in Cagayan and the Batanes islands further north of Luzon, the second EDCA phase seemingly reflects more of an accommodation of U.S. than Philippine interests.
President Marcos’ stance has also raised alarm among politicians in some provinces hosting the bases, in addition to national legislators, who are concerned that the country may be drawn into a military showdown between the U.S. and China over Taiwan.
The EDCA has been extensively transformed during the last decade, but not in a predictable and straightforward way. How it is applied in the near future will depend on whether President Marcos utilizes it in the interests of the Philippines and the region or those of the U.S. in its geopolitical rivalry with China and the potential defense of Taiwan.
Scenarios
More likely: Marcos does not activate EDCA in defense of Taiwan
In his keynote address at the 2024 Shangri-la Dialogue in Singapore, President Marcos stated that “strategic competition between China and the United States is permeating the evolving regional landscape. This rivalry is constraining the choices of regional states.” However, he went on to say that, in meeting this challenge, “the region looks to ASEAN [the 10-member Association of Southeast Asian Nations] as the institution that will hold the center amidst these evolving dynamics.”
From this perspective, President Marcos is placing primacy on advocating a multilateral approach to geopolitical challenges by promoting “ASEAN-centrality” as a means of defusing and resolving tensions in the region. While ASEAN is primarily a trade and development association, his principal foreign policy focus is to try and elevate this regional institution as the key mechanism in dealing with the potential of escalating rivalry between the U.S. and China.
In parallel to the pivotal role ASEAN could play in fostering and maintaining regional peace, President Marcos is also likely to press ahead with his own foreign policy approach in balancing relations between the U.S. and China.
To this end, he has assured the Chinese government that the EDCA bases will neither be used as staging posts for military actions against another state nor will they be employed for offensive purposes generally. At the same time, he continues to expand and intensify his defense cooperation with the U.S. and its Western allies.
In practical terms, President Marcos’ focus and persistence in advocating diplomacy and communication with Beijing in the face of recent aggressive Chinese actions in the South China Sea, rather than invoking powerful American military support through the Mutual Defense Treaty, is a reflection of his resolve to achieve peaceful outcomes.
These skills may also prove an invaluable dress rehearsal in his exercising diplomacy through the top-level lines of communication he has forged with both Washington and Beijing, should a future U.S.-China military confrontation arise over Taiwan.
Less likely: Marcos utilizes EDCA bases in a Taiwan conflict
The president of the Philippines has been cultivating strong relations with Washington since the onset of his administration. The posture has marked a major U-turn from his predecessor’s tilting of relations toward Beijing.
Moreover, in a strategically important meeting with U.S. President Joe Biden, President Marcos obtained commitments that the U.S. would defend the Philippines against Chinese military aggression in line with their treaty.
It may be logical to assume, therefore, that the two presidents agreed a quid pro quo in their mutual support of each other’s security interests vis-a-vis China.
Throughout the first two years of his presidency, Mr. Marcos has also been incrementally, if informally, recognizing U.S.-led security partnerships designed to contain China.
This included his endorsement of the Quad, bringing together India, the U.S., Japan and Australia, in addition to AUKUS, an Australia-United Kingdom-U.S. nuclear-powered submarine-building program. By contrast, other ASEAN heads of state have been either ambivalent or outright skeptical of such security groupings in the region.
President Marcos had also recently concluded a visiting forces agreement with Japan. It was the first such accord between Tokyo and any Asian state.
Regarding future policy objectives, the Philippine president announced his participation in discussions over a trilateral defense treaty with the United States and Japan, while endorsing regular naval patrols of the South China Sea alongside the U.S., Australia, Japan and possibly South Korea, which are anticipated to begin later this year.
Mr. Marcos’ expanding web of formal and informal military partnerships with the U.S. and its regional allies, amid his surprise introduction of new military bases, may, in substance, indicate that he is preparing to actively engage in support of U.S. military operations in a clash with China over Taiwan.
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