Any new U.S. administration will be challenged in the Middle East
The U.S. is overstretched as a security provider. The next president may introduce Middle East policy changes, but his or her maneuver room will remain tight.
In a nutshell
- No U.S. administration can disengage from the Middle East
- Western geopolitical interests there are crucial and enduring
- Russia and China continue challenging the status quo in the region
The United States faces significant challenges in protecting its vital interests in the Middle East, regardless of the outcome of the November 2024 national elections. Both a future Republican and Democratic administration will likely adopt distinct regional strategies.
However, even substantial shifts in U.S. policy are unlikely to promptly address the escalating security, economic and political crises affecting the Middle East. The U.S. will need to balance its commitments in this region against pressing demands in other critical areas, such as Europe and the Indo-Pacific. That will be difficult to do unless American policy can achieve regional stability in at least one of these three major theaters and avoid other entanglements in Latin America, Africa, Central Asia and the Caucuses.
Policy pivot impossible
Neither a Republican nor Democratic administration is likely to disengage from the Middle East. Both the Obama (2009-2017) and Biden (2021-present) administrations initially aimed to reduce the U.S. footprint in the region, yet both ended up even more deeply involved by the end of their terms. Currently, the U.S. maintains its most significant military deployment in the area in recent years, with approximately 45,000 personnel stationed there.
This situation underscores that the weight of American interests in the Middle East inevitably compels any U.S. administration to reengage whenever regional stability is at risk.
The current U.S. military deployment in the region, primarily consisting of maritime and air forces, underscores the significant limitations on any potential security pivot to Asia. Presently, approximately 70 percent of U.S. naval forces are stationed in Asia. If the U.S. were to shift additional resources to the Indo-Pacific, it would lack the capacity to conduct major operations in other regions, even with the involvement of allied forces.
The U.S. policy of preventing external powers from dominating the Middle East remains a bipartisan commitment applicable to both Russia and China.
For instance, the U.S. armed forces would not have the means to protect shipping in the Red Sea from Houthi attacks, deter Iran, support Israel or maintain a presence in the Mediterranean while also countering Russian activities in the Black Sea. Additionally, the U.S. military presence in the Mediterranean and Middle East offers a surge capability that can respond to contingencies ranging from the Arctic and Central Asia to Africa.
While the U.S. cannot afford to reduce its military deployment in this region, significant increases in American military presence are unlikely, as the U.S. seeks to simultaneously sustain adequate conventional forces to deter threats from China, Iran and Russia across multiple theaters. Consequently, the U.S. will primarily be positioned to reassure allies, support collective self-defense, ensure freedom of navigation and contribute to conventional deterrence.
Great power competition in the Middle East
The influence of external powers has been a constant factor in the geopolitics of the Middle East throughout the modern era. That is unlikely to change, as the geostrategic importance of the region is not declining. In 1980, U.S. President Jimmy Carter (1977-1981) declared what became known as the Carter Doctrine, stating that the U.S. would use military force if necessary to defend its national interests in the Persian Gulf. This declaration was intended as an explicit deterrent against the Soviet Union.
The U.S. policy of preventing external powers from dominating the Middle East remains a bipartisan commitment applicable to both Russia and China. However, in recent years, U.S. administrations have increasingly sought alternatives to military deterrence to achieve this objective. Following the setbacks in Iraq and Afghanistan, and with limited ground troop availability across multiple theaters, neither a Republican nor a Democratic administration would proactively pursue “boots on the ground” or attempt to impose “regime change” on adversarial governments.
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Importantly, neither Russia nor China possesses the freedom of action necessary to launch a significant effort in the Middle East. Their influence is primarily exerted through cooperative actions with Iran, forming an alliance driven by a combination of weakness, necessity and mutual animosity toward the U.S. and its interests. However, their future activity will be constrained by several factors: the strains on China’s economy, the debilitating impact on Russia of its war in Ukraine and fluctuating energy prices, which will impact all their economies – as both exporters and consumers.
Facts & figures
Strong military presence
A complex landscape of policy challenges
No future U.S. administration will rely solely on military force in the foreseeable future to create a more favorable environment for American interests. Instead, the U.S. will increasingly turn to other instruments of national power to influence regional outcomes. This is where the policies of Republican and Democratic administrations could diverge significantly, both in terms of the means employed and the objectives pursued.
Given the diverse and complex array of challenges the U.S. faces, it is improbable that any administration will adopt a one-size-fits-all approach to regional policy. Future U.S. administrations will need to navigate a multitude of pressing challenges, including the following key issues:
Iran. If there is one consistent U.S. objective in the Middle East, despite varying strategies, it is to prevent Iran from becoming an established nuclear power. Recent public assessments from Western intelligence confirm that Iran’s nuclear status is now less about technical capability and more about political decisions. The debate over whether the Iran nuclear deal (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, or JCPOA) would have been sufficient to deter Iran’s nuclear program is now irrelevant, as Iran has surpassed the level of nuclear enrichment necessary for producing nuclear weapons.
A sustainable agreement between Palestinians and Israelis is likely still a generation away.
While the Trump administration may have briefly deterred Iran by constraining its economy and proxies, the regime has since rebounded. The past strategies of both Republican and Democratic administrations are no longer adequate to contain Iran’s nuclear ambitions.
Israel. It has become both a domestic and foreign policy issue in the U.S. At home, organized networks fueled by foreign money and American philanthropy are contributing to rising antisemitism and anti-Zionism, significantly undermining traditional bipartisan support for Israel. Nevertheless, Israel’s importance as a critical regional ally remains unchanged. In the U.S., the two-state solution has become a central political talking point, with the consensus being that a sustainable agreement between Palestinians and Israelis is likely still a generation away.
The fundamental challenge for any administration will be to maintain support for Israel within the U.S. while developing a sustainable security strategy to protect Israeli territory and citizens from attacks by Iranian proxies, including Hamas, Hezbollah, the Houthis and factions in Syria and Iraq, as well as direct threats from Iran. No Israeli government can endure long if it fails to demonstrate its ability to protect its people and revitalize the economy while addressing escalating security demands. Achieving both objectives becomes increasingly difficult without U.S. support, which remains irreplaceable. In the near term, there is no viable alternative to this strategic dependence.
Turkey and Qatar. Both continue to attract controversy in the U.S. for various reasons, including Qatari funding of American universities and Turkey’s support for the Muslim Brotherhood. These issues have led to clashes between Republicans and Democrats over policies regarding these nations. Nonetheless, bipartisan relations have remained stable due to the critical strategic importance of these relationships for the U.S. The incoming president will need to find ways to improve ties and safeguard U.S. interests in the face of potentially hostile attitudes toward the two in Washington.
Emerging issues in the Middle East
Several issues present the U.S. with opportunities for action that could significantly influence American policy and regional stability.
Energy. Republicans and Democrats have sharply divergent views on energy policy. Republicans emphasize the need to increase the availability of reliable, affordable energy and enhance energy security by reducing dependence on Russian and Iranian exports. In contrast, Democrats prioritize green transition strategies and net-zero goals.
The incoming administration will face volatile and challenging conditions without a strong domestic consensus on policy.
Nuclear deterrence. The U.S. must be concerned not only about a nuclear Iran but also about the potential for escalating regional nuclear proliferation in response to Iran’s nuclear threat. Future administrations will face critical decisions regarding the extension of the U.S. nuclear umbrella, the expansion of strategic missile defense and other options for enhancing deterrence.
Regional supply chains. The rise of the Indian economy and other factors driving Indo-Pacific trade will place greater emphasis on connectivity projects, such as the Southern Gas Corridor (to connect the economies of Europe with India, Pakistan and Bangladesh, and ultimately with those further eastward) and the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC). The U.S.’s role in these regional developments will significantly affect its influence, engagement and interests.
Arab states. There is a strong bipartisan consensus in the U.S. that Israeli-Arab normalization can be revitalized through enhanced security, economic and diplomatic cooperation. The issue will be what constructive role the U.S. can play in facilitating this process.
Scenarios
Most likely: No clear strategic trajectory for the U.S.
Regardless of whether Republicans or Democrats take the White House next year, the incoming administration will face volatile and challenging conditions without a strong domestic consensus on policy.
While potential leaders from both parties may have distinct initial policy preferences, they will need to adapt, innovate and respond to the realities on the ground. The primary goal for whoever assumes the presidency will likely be to stabilize the region, which would not only strengthen NATO’s southern flank but also enable the U.S. to address growing demands in the Indo-Pacific.
Undoubtedly, the foremost challenge will be managing relations with Iran, making it an early priority for the next administration. However, it may take years before the U.S. can confidently assert that it is safeguarding its interests in the region.
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