One year after October 7: Iran and Israel on the brink
Iran has made a second strong strike on Israel. Jerusalem’s response, the fate of Hezbollah and preserving Iran’s oil exports will determine Tehran’s future strategy.
In a nutshell
- Hezbollah is a crucial proxy for Tehran, which seeks to avoid direct conflict
- Pezeshkian seeks economic recovery, favoring restraint over assault
- Iran fears Israeli retaliation could cripple its vital oil export infrastructure
One year after Hamas’s deadly October 7, 2023 attack on Israel, the Jewish state finds itself in an increasingly hot conflict with Iran. On October 8, 2023, Hezbollah launched a war of attrition against Israel. On September 17, 2024, Israel escalated this war into a fully-fledged offensive against Hezbollah, a terrorist organization sponsored by Iran. This offensive culminated in the assassination of the group’s leader, Hassan Nasrallah in Beirut on Friday September 27.
The Israeli offensive landed Hezbollah in its deepest crisis ever. One example of the degree of paranoia in the organization’s ranks is that by early October Nasrallah was still not yet buried, for fear that Israel will eliminate the remaining leaders at the burial ceremony. On October 3 Israel destroyed Hezbollah’s Intelligence Command bunker, possibly killing Nasrallah’s replacement, Hashem Safi al-Din. The Israeli offensive also landed Tehran in uncharted territory. For the first time since the 1982 establishment of Hezbollah in Lebanon, the organization turned from a formidable strategic asset for Iran into a burden.
Tehran found itself both indecisive and mired in a blame game. President Masoud Pezeshkian has been denounced by Iranians for preventing a deterring strike on Israel earlier, following the Tehran assassination of Hamas’s Ismail Haniyeh. Iran’s intelligence services have been castigated for Israel’s deep penetration into Iran and Lebanon. Indeed, prior to the rare public appearance on Friday October 4 of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei during which he affirmed his support for his regime’s latest strikes, reports were circulating that he had been whisked away to a safe house. It may be assumed that many other leaders in Tehran are still nervous.
The Israeli offensive landed Hezbollah in its deepest crisis ever. It also landed Tehran in uncharted territory.
Until the mid-September offensive, the tense wait in Israel since its July 31 assassination in Tehran of Ismail Haniyeh, late chairman of Hamas, was easing. One sign was that the Pentagon announced on September 12 that the U.S.S. Theodore Roosevelt Carrier Strike Group is leaving the CENTCOM area of responsibility and was en route to the Indo-Pacific region.
For months, Iranian military commanders promised direct retaliation, citing one reason: The tension and anticipation of an expected attack are part of Tehran’s punishment for Israeli society. But there was a second reason. Since the assassination of the Hamas politician, an internal struggle has been waged in Iran over the heart, mind and image of the “Rahbar,” the country’s Supreme Leader Mr. Khamenei.
Until early August, Iranian leadership and media were unanimous. The consensus was that for its flagrant abuse of Iranian sovereignty, Israel was to be punished swiftly, directly and more heavily than Iran’s attack on Israel in mid-April. Even Masoud Pezeshkian, Iran’s new president since July 28 who is characterized as a pragmatic reformist, adamantly rejected French President Emmanuel Macron’s appeal for Iran to show restraint.
Yet, President Pezeshkian himself provided a crucial hint that something had changed in Tehran. A regional war, he suggested, would be averted if Israel stopped the war in Gaza. In other words, a cease-fire in Gaza could prevent, or at least limit or delay, a direct Iranian response. Without that, however, a significant assault would come. By late September, though, with the conflict in Gaza reaching its one-year mark, no Iranian assault had taken place. Furthermore, on September 8, Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Commander Major General Hossein Salami said that Iran would take revenge for Israel’s “evils,” but “in a different way” from an immediate direct attack. This signaled that Iran was toning down its bluster.
Then, on September 17, there were near-simultaneous explosions attributed to Israel of some 5,000 pagers in Lebanon and Syria, wounding at least 3,000 and killing more than 40 Hezbollah activists, as well as civilians. The next day, some 500 handheld communication devices (“walkie-talkies”) exploded, killing at least a dozen more people.
Tehran’s response
While Hezbollah, as expected, promised heavy retaliation, the Iranian response was surprising. On September 19, Mr. Salami pledged that the “Axis of Resistance,” meaning Hezbollah, the Iraqi pro-Iranian militias and the Houthis – but not Iran – would retaliate in great force. President Pezeshkian described the Israeli attacks as a “disgrace for the West” and “the decline of humanity and the rise of barbarism”. No one, though, promised an immediate and direct Iranian retaliation. What held Iran back even following the assassinations in Beirut?
What seems to have changed first became apparent a few weeks earlier, on August 9, when the regime leaked that Mr. Pezeshkian made an astonishing appeal to Mr. Khamenei to reconsider a potential attack on Israel. According to the report, President Pezeshkian feared an Israeli response that could “collapse the Iranian economy.” As an alternative, he proposed attacking secret Israeli installations in Iraqi Kurdistan or in Azerbaijan.
President Pezeshkian was reportedly at odds with the IRGC over how to respond to Israel’s killing of Hamas leader Haniyeh in Tehran, highlighting the likely existence of fissures between the relatively moderate president and some elements of the IRGC. Iranian presidential aides told The Telegraph on August 9 that the IRGC wants to directly strike military targets in Tel Aviv and other Israeli cities, while Mr. Pezeshkian seeks to avoid a direct attack on Israel. The presidential aides claimed that Mr. Pezeshkian is concerned that a direct Iranian strike on Israel will cause an “all-out war.”
President Pezeshkian’s appeal may be better understood if we remember that during the presidential election campaign he promised to jump-start the Iranian economy. The profound economic reforms that Iran needs, such as reducing institutionalized corruption, are impossible under the current regime, meaning the only way to resuscitate the economy is to increase oil revenues. But that is not possible under the American embargo. This is why President Pezeshkian sought to tie the economic recovery plan to a new nuclear agreement with the United States.
Unless Iran was playing dead to deceive Israel until Russia upgrades its anti-aircraft system, this hit showed that their oil industry is a sitting duck.
However, President Pezeshkian knows that even before he can contemplate boosting Iran’s economy, he must ensure that the current oil revenues keep flowing into state coffers. Iran’s oil exports reached $35.8 billion in the 12 months ending in March 2024. As petroleum accounts for roughly 80 percent of Iran’s exports, those revenues are essential for keeping the country’s economy afloat.
Tehran understands the damage Israel can inflict on its oil industry, knows what Israel did to the Houthi oil harbor of Hodeida in July, again on September 29, and that Israel can inflict tenfold damage to Iranian oil exports. As a result, the Houthis essentially stopped their attacks against Israel.
Banda Abbas, a port city on Iran’s Persian Gulf coast, handles roughly 80 percent of all the country’s exports. The small island of Kharg is exporting most of Iran’s oil. The distance between Israel and Hudeida is 2,000 kilometers, while that from Israel to Bandar Abbas and Kharg is a mere 1,500 kilometers.
Furthermore, much like Hudeida, Bandar Abbas and Kharg, too, are fully exposed to the Israeli Air Force. That was made clear to Tehran when, following its April 2024 missile and drone attacks, Israel’s response was to send a single missile that targeted and destroyed an anti-aircraft battery protecting a central Iranian nuclear site. Unless Iran was playing dead to deceive Israel until Russia upgrades its anti-aircraft system, this hit showed that their oil industry is a sitting duck.
Concerns in Tehran and Moscow
Still, how does a president who was elected by the grace of the supreme leader voice that he does not want to attack Israel? This was enormous chutzpah, which can even be considered an affront to national honor in Iran. The most likely explanation, however, is that in their August 8 meeting, Supreme Leader Khamenei himself instructed the president to leak that he, the president, had asked for restraint.
By Sunday, August 11, many senior officials had called for revenge and reported that Mr. Khamenei had ordered it, but he had not yet said so publicly. The supreme leader was undecided. His hesitation may also be understood in view of the U.S. Navy gathering near Iranian and Lebanese shores.
Also, Sergei Shoigu, head of Russia’s National Security Council, made an urgent visit to Tehran on August 5, apparently to discuss the shipment of new anti-aircraft technology. However, fearing that Israel and the U.S. would launch an all-out war on its ally that supplies drones it uses in Ukraine, Russia is thought to have advised the Iranians against a direct reprisal.
There is no certainty that Mr. Khamenei wanted a direct attack on Israel in April. The supreme leader is cautious and calculating. The American intention to help Israel defend itself was clear to him. He may have been pushed into the direct attack because he could not afford to appear defeatist. The late hardline president, Ebrahim Raisi, and his allies the IRGC and the Front of Islamic Revolution Steadfastness (Jebhe Paydari), the largest and most extreme party in parliament, had been pushing for war.
Had it not been for the May 19 helicopter crash in which Mr. Raisi and Hossein Amir-Abdollahian, his likeminded foreign minister, died, Supreme Leader Khamenei might have been pushed for an immediate and direct attack on Israel following its July assassination of Haniyeh in Tehran. But this time, he had a pragmatic president and a foreign minister who was both a close associate and a relative.
The nature of Iranian leaders
There are no moderates in the Iranian leadership, but there are pragmatists, extremists and ultra-extremists. Mr. Khamenei himself is extremist enough: Ayatollah Khomeini chose him to make sure that his Islamic Revolution would not fizzle out after his death. Yet, Mr. Khamenei’s concern over the late president and his alliance with the ultra-extremists was known in Iran. Therefore, to this day, many Iranians believe that the helicopter accident that killed President Raisi was not an accident.
Be that as it may, Mr. Khamenei’s preference for a president was very different this time. Before the late Mr. Raisi became president, the supreme leader ensured that no reformists would be allowed to run. The result was a sheer drop in the number of eligible voters who showed up at the ballot stations. That was seen as a no-confidence vote in the regime. The next time around, this spring, one reformist (out of eight candidates) was allowed to run. It was clear for two reasons that Mr. Pezeshkian had an excellent chance of reaching the second round. First, all the liberals would vote for him. Second, the seven other candidates split the extremist vote.
Eventually, Mr. Pezeshkian ran against Saeed Jalili, the representative of the ultra-extremists. He was an uncompromising former nuclear negotiator and is head of the country’s top security council. Mr. Jalili promised more suppression of opposition voices and a “struggle-economy,” namely, eternal poverty and want for the masses. His election would have been a repeat of Raisi’s presidency, yet more extreme. This was the last thing the supreme leader needed.
For his part, Mr. Pezeshkian promised improved international relations, a new effort to reach a nuclear agreement, economic recovery and less domestic suppression. In addition to the liberal voters who supported him in the first round, many citizens who previously supported hard-liners were now willing to vote for a pragmatic candidate.
This careful political engineering rewarded Supreme Leader Khamenei with a new president who was sure to position him exactly where he wanted to be: at the center of the Iranian political elite’s spectrum. While the Paydari Front, the top IRGC command, some mullahs and others were certain to demand a reckless national security policy and a crackdown on insufficiently veiled women, President Pezeshkian and his government could be trusted to advocate the opposite. Eventually, Mr. Khamenei would operate as an arbiter rather than as a dictator. After President Pezeshkian’s mostly reformist-inclined government was approved, the lines were drawn.
Present-day Iran
What, then, was happening in Tehran just before the assassination of Hassan Nasrallah in Beirut? When it comes to the possibility of a direct Iranian attack on Israel, the ayatollahs’ regime had no interest in it. Ayatollah Khamenei listened to both sides and decided. His conclusion rested on a cold calculation: A direct confrontation with Israel and the U.S., supported by Gulf states and Jordan, made no sense. Iran did not give up on revenge, but it decided that it would be served cold.
What were the chances that Iran would change its policy following Nasrallah’s assassination? Tehran sees Hezbollah as the most precious element of Ayatollah Khomeini’s legacy abroad. However, until September 27 there was an understanding between Tehran and Hezbollah that what happens in Lebanon stays in Lebanon, and what happens in Iran stays in Iran. Nasrallah, for example, never promised to avenge the April assassination of the Iranian general in Damascus, or Haniya’s July assassination in Tehran. Likewise, before September 27 Iran did not respond to the assassinations of very senior Hezbollah commanders in Lebanon.
It was clear that Iran will intervene directly against Israel only if it believes that the organization’s very existence is threatened. In mid-to-late September, that was not (yet) the case. Is this approach still in play even after the killing in the Dahiya of Hezbollah’s leader, his lieutenants, and a very senior Iranian advisor? Until October 1 there was no sign of change in Tehran. The two camps seemed still unchanged: the pragmatists against the extremists, and Mr. Khamenei in the middle, as arbiter.
Read more by Middle East expert Amatzia Baram
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On September 23, President Pezeshkian said in New York that such a war is an Israeli trap. He even told the media that his country “is interested in reducing tension with Israel” if Israel does the same. His foreign minister also demonstrated such a tone, saying that Iran is willing to resume the nuclear negotiations. Immediately following Nasrallah’s assassination, the supreme leader vowed that the Resistance Front will punish Israel but was careful not to promise an immediate and direct Iranian attack on the Jewish state.
In the evening of Tuesday, October 1, Iran lobbed some 180 missiles at central Israel, but it also declared that this way the accounts were fully settled. The double whammy of Haniyeh’s assassination in Tehran and Nasrallah’s in Beirut was too much for the supreme leader. Scorn by Iran’s enemies and despair in the ranks of Iran’s supporters who were pulling their hair at the Iranian impotence added weight to the radical camp’s demand for action. In view of Israeli threats to retaliate, Iranian spokesmen announced on October 3 that if “Israel supporters” intervene directly, their interests in the region would be targeted. The Gulf states, for their part, were seeking to convince Iran that they are not involved.
Israel’s considerations
Before its mid-September offensive, Israel was ready for a cease-fire with Hezbollah. Then, Israel wanted quick negotiations that would lead to Hezbollah’s withdrawal from the border.
Following the success of the initial Israeli offensive against Hezbollah, a lively debate in Israel ensued regarding next steps. Some demanded a limited land invasion and the creation of a narrow security zone in southern Lebanon, pending a diplomatic step that will allow a retreat to the border in exchange for a guarantee that Hezbollah does not infiltrate back. The people of the Galilee demanded such an invasion. Others, though, feared the cost of such an invasion in terms of American wrath, high civilian casualties and a quagmire syndrome. They recommended sticking to the aerial assaults. By the end of September, Israel decided on the invasion option.
Iran’s nuclear plan
Regarding a nuclear agreement, President Pezeshkian has made it clear that he is interested, and that is likely the direction the supreme leader himself is heading. There are three reasons, though, why a new U.S.-Iran agreement is doubtful.
First, there is strong opposition to a deal with the Americans in Iran: A few influential figures have announced that Iran must rush to develop a nuclear weapon. Second, the U.S. will vote for new leadership in November. The current administration of President Joe Biden may feel that such a complicated negotiating process will be too much of a burden with less than a month until election day. Third, the rising temperature of the Iranian-Israeli powder keg will make it extremely difficult to hold serious negotiations with the U.S.
Regional relations
In the field of Middle Eastern relations, President Pezeshkian has a freer hand. His first visit after assuming office was to Iraq, where he signed some economic agreements, but most noticeably, on September 13, he visited Kurdistan. While under the late president, Iran bombed Kurdistan. Yet President Pezeshkian has sought to make peace with the leaders of both of the autonomous Iraqi region’s adversarial groups, the Kurdistan Democratic Party and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan. However, in view of the Iranian threats against the Arab Gulf states, the president’s attempts to improve regional relations have limited scope for success.
Scenarios
Probable on the Lebanese-Israeli front: Eventual cease-fire, nullification of Doha Agreement
A probable scenario for the Lebanese state and Israel is a cease-fire, then an Israeli withdrawal as part of an agreement, based on UN Security Council Resolution 1701. The Resolution demands Hezbollah’s disarmament and retreat from the Israeli-Lebanese border beyond the Litani River. Najib Mikati, the Lebanese interim prime minister, has announced his support for this solution several times since October 7, 2023. The problem is that Hezbollah is certain to breach the agreement as it did in 2006 and, as happened then, the Lebanese state will be powerless to enforce it. The border zone will again become a war zone.
Both from an Israeli and a Lebanese point of view there is a solution to this problem. The Iranian announcement that the account with Israel is closed implies that for now Hezbollah is on its own. The Western powers and the Saudis will exploit Hezbollah’s moment of crisis to reverse the May 2008 Doha Agreement. This agreement sold Lebanon to Hezbollah by giving it a veto right over any government decision, making its disarmament impossible. If the Doha Agreement is rendered null and void, it will be possible to turn Hezbollah into an unarmed political party.
While this will be difficult, in view of Hezbollah’s profound crisis, it has a chance. For two years there has been no president in Lebanon. The first step is for the country’s parliament to elect a new president that will not be an ally of Hezbollah. On October 5, Shia Parliament Speaker Nabih Berry hinted that this is possible. The president in Lebanon has vast authorities. If the U.S., France and the Gulf states promise Lebanon an economic relief and reconstruction, there will be public support for Hezbollah’s disarmament even among the Shia community.
If the Doha Agreement remains in force, though, Israel’s doubts over the value of a diplomatic agreement with Lebanon can be mollified in two different ways. One is that a new UN or international force will be introduced to southern Lebanon. However, unlike the UN Interim Force in Lebanon, they will receive “a license to kill.” Namely, they will be authorized to prevent with live fire any Hezbollah attempt to infiltrate back to the border. Another possibility is that Israel will be recognized by the UN (or the U.S.) as the power implementing Resolution 1701 in the border area, with the same “license.” This is the minimum condition under which the people of the Galilee and south Lebanon can return to their homes.
Most likely on the Israeli-Iranian front: An Israeli reprisal
The October 1 Iranian missile attack had limited success. According to the Washington Post, some 13%, or 24 missiles, penetrated through the Israeli air defenses, falling in the military air bases of Tel Nof and Nevatim. This, however, failed to disrupt the activity of the Israeli Air Force and there were no casualties.
The U.S. is profoundly wary of a regional war. Therefore, it is using much more pressure than before on Israel to satisfy itself with less than a massive attack, for example through tighter sanctions on Iran.
Yet, in view of its restraint in April, for Israel a heavy reprisal this time is critical. Options are military targets, like Iran’s missile force, economic ones like oil infrastructure, government offices and shelters, or even Iran’s nuclear project. If Israel attacks, and if Iran retaliates against the Gulf states, this may force the U.S. to do the improbable: attack Iran’s nuclear assets. This is a weighty reason for Iran to limit its reaction to Israel. Israel’s dilemma is how to strike without pushing Iran too far.
Be that as it may, following a possible heavy reprisal, Iran will activate its proxies, even if they have been somewhat degraded. Rockets, missiles and drones will be launched from Lebanon, Yemen, Iraq and Syria, and militiamen will try to infiltrate Israel from Syria and Jordan. Tehran will also try to recruit the Syrian regime, but Bashar al-Assad will resist, as he has resisted fighting Israel until now. Iranian proxies also are very likely to attack American troops in Iraq and Syria.
Finally, most, though not all Israelis, consider the release of Israel’s hostages from Hamas dungeons a supreme interest of the Jewish state. Yet the shifting of the military and political focus from Gaza to Lebanon and Iran diminishes the chances of securing the release of the hostages.
The supreme leader Mr. Khamenei is likely to wait until it is clear that only its direct strikes on Israel can save Hezbollah from extinction. If by then Iran is a nuclear power, he will likely threaten Israel with a nuclear attack. No Iranian leader can survive the destruction of the late Khomeini’s precious legacy.
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