Beijing intensifies gray tactics against Taiwan
Newly elected Taiwanese President Lai Ching-te is struggling to counter the creative use of pressure coming from China.
In a nutshell
- Newfound urgency for Xi Jinping on the Taiwan issue
- For Beijing, Lai Ching-te has crossed new lines
- China unlikely to use force until exhausting gray tactics
Three months after President Lai Ching-te took office in Taiwan, Beijing continues to seek ways to make life difficult for the new leader. At the beginning, despite Mr. Lai’s measured rhetoric (from his perspective) at his May 20 inauguration, the reaction in China was extreme displeasure. The Chinese State Council’s Taiwan Affairs Office slammed Mr. Lai for “stubbornly adhering to the ‘Taiwan independence’ position,” while Foreign Minister Wang Yi accused him of “betraying the nation and his ancestors in a disgraceful way.”
Beijing’s response was largely triggered by President Lai’s refusal to deliver his inaugural speech in accordance with Chinese expectations. Officials described the address as even more pro-independence than those of previous Taiwanese leaders, and as a point of no return. Since then, Beijing has given clear signals as to the implications of this perception, with consequences for cross-Strait relations over the next four years.
The approach of Lai Ching-te
Mr. Lai did not mention a single word about Taiwanese “independence” in his speech. But unlike his scholarly predecessor, Tsai Ing-wen (2016-2024), the current leader’s governance style is seen as more “manly” and unafraid of conflict, while lacking a degree of sophistication. Compared to his predecessors, he comes closer to what Beijing considers the red line around the issue of Taiwanese independence.
For example, the “two-state theory” drafted by former President Lee Teng-hui (1988-2000) has gone through a 25-year-long evolution from ambiguity to clarity. In his first address, Lai Ching-te was more forceful in elaborating on the cross-Strait issue, avoiding mention of the Cross-Strait Act, which implies that the two sides of the Taiwan Strait belong to the same China. He also used the term “China” throughout the speech, instead of “the other side of the Taiwan Strait” or “Beijing,” terms purposely used in Ms. Tsai’s inaugural speeches of 2016 and 2020 to avoid anger from mainland China.
While Ms. Tsai’s “one-China” hopes seemed to persist, however obscured, in the eyes of Beijing, Mr. Lai’s positioning on cross-Strait relations has transformed strategic ambiguity into strategic clarity.
In a June interview, President Lai emphasized “dignity and reciprocity” in his dealings with China, and invited Chinese President Xi Jinping to share with Taiwan the responsibility for peace and stability in the region and to create prosperity. It has become clear that this line of messaging has had no effect on the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) attitude.
China’s response
Facing President Lai’s “iron fist in a velvet glove,” Beijing quickly adopted various measures – both soft and hard, internal and external – with the clear intention of trying to hinder Mr. Lai’s government.
Beijing’s intimidation began with military power. Just three days after the inauguration, China began a two-day, large-scale military drill. It is worth comparing this to a previous episode. When former United States Speaker of the House of Representatives Nancy Pelosi led a delegation to Taiwan in August 2022, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) also conducted a military drill and organized live-fire exercises in six sea and air areas surrounding the island.
This time, despite the lack of live-fire operations, the “pockets” were tightened – in other words, the scope and degree of deterrence were significantly greater than following Ms. Pelosi’s visit. At the same time, Beijing continued to use various military aircraft to fly over the center line of the Taiwan Strait. Soon, it even appeared that civilian aircraft were being used to fly over Taiwan-controlled Kinmen.
Facts & figures
Chinese military drills around Taiwan
Along with military signals, Beijing has stepped up its information war against Taiwan, spreading a great deal of disinformation in Taiwanese media. It has also taken economic measures, such as suspending tariff concessions for some products under the Cross-Strait Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement and erecting trade barriers to more Taiwanese products on antidumping grounds. Diplomatically, Beijing has increased efforts to isolate Taiwan and intimidate its allies.
Tactical adjustments
At the same time, the Chinese government under President Xi has changed its approach this year. This is reflected in two ways. On the one hand, prior to President Lai’s inauguration, the Kuomintang (KMT) party in Taiwan had positive interactions with the government in Beijing. The culmination was an April 10 meeting between former KMT Taiwanese President Ma Ying-jeou (2008-2016) and Mr. Xi. By meeting with an outgoing president who is no longer in the political arena, and scheduling the meeting one month before Taiwan’s new president was sworn in, Mr. Xi aimed to convey the message that, given the choice, Beijing would still prefer “peaceful reunification” with Taiwan over a costly reincorporation by force. According to sources familiar with the matter, Mr. Ma even submitted a report to the Chinese side on specific issues such as the country’s proposed name after a future cross-Strait reunification.
Although China has not reported these developments, Beijing has a high opinion of these positive interactions with the KMT. It gave Beijing good reason to believe that there is still enough room to further exploit the position of KMT, as well as the Taiwan People’s Party (TPP), to the point of discrediting and paralyzing Mr. Lai’s government. This led to a chain of events in which the KMT and the TPP, which have a majority in the Executive Yuan, turned on Mr. Lai’s Democratic Progressive Party after his inauguration, with the outcome still uncertain.
Beijing will generally not use force until it has exhausted its gray tactics and other means of creating divisions in Taiwan.
The other area of China’s change in strategy was diplomacy. Beijing has decided to take every measure to reduce U.S. pressure in East Asia. The military cooperation between Japan, South Korea and the U.S. established by the administration of President Joe Biden is a major threat to China’s incorporation of Taiwan by force. To this end, in May, Beijing restarted a meeting of the leaders of China, Japan and South Korea after over four years of hiatus. Chinese Premier Li Qiang called for greater contributions to regional prosperity and stability, seeking to use the bait of new cooperation to pick apart the U.S.-Japan-South Korea alliance.
It is important to realize that China is Japan’s largest trading partner, export destination and import source, with bilateral trade totaling $317 billion in 2023. China is also South Korea’s largest trading partner, largest export market and largest import source, with their trade amounting to $310 billion last year. This economic dependence is a card in Beijing’s hand.
Xi’s Taiwan timeline
Although the CCP has never disclosed (and will never disclose) a timeline for the “liberation” of Taiwan, President Xi’s unwillingness to leave the issue unresolved during his third or fourth five-year term in office is obvious to all. While Mr. Xi made a point of recently telling European Commission President Ursula Von der Leyen, in an effort to win European sympathy, that Washington was trying to “goad Beijing into attacking Taiwan” (as if China itself had no intention of doing so), there are increasingly hints that the timetable is changing.
Zhang Weiwei, a professor at Fudan University and a favorite of the Chinese propaganda ministry, claimed publicly that Taiwan’s recent election might be its last. He Lei, a former PLA official, also recently said that the complete reunification of the motherland was growing nearer. What Beijing fears is that if President Lai Ching-te stays in his position for eight years, the mindset of “Taiwan independence” will be even more deeply embedded in the minds of the island’s younger generation, and it will be difficult to eradicate it even with a change of political parties. The time pressure is thus increasing.
The Lai tenure so far
Fully matching the new president’s character, Taiwan under Mr. Lai appears set to be more determined to pursue high-end military hardware, such as submarines and fighter jets, and focus on military training to defend against a Chinese invasion. But all of this will do little to stop China’s gradual imposition of coercive control through law enforcement and other nonlethal, “gray” tactics. Taiwan is trying to take steps to counter the mainland’s salami slicing.
Taiwan’s previous administration clearly disappointed and confused many young people during its eight-year tenure on social issues, especially housing and employment. And that legacy is now being borne by President Lai Ching-te. He leads a minority government without a majority in the Legislative Yuan, which would already have made it difficult for him to govern, not to mention that the opposition party in the legislature is trying to reduce the scope of the president’s power.
In polls after Mr. Lai’s inaugural speech, 53 percent of those who watched were satisfied with his May 20 inaugural address, 28 percent were dissatisfied, and 19 percent had no opinion. Some 47 percent of respondents said they trusted Mr. Lai, compared to 34 percent who did not trust him and 20 percent with no opinion.
Nearly a month later, a poll by the Taiwan Public Opinion Foundation found that the number of people approving of President Lai’s handling of the country’s affairs has decreased by 9.8 percent, suggesting that he has lost support from nearly 2 million people since taking office. Arguably, China’s combination of soft and hard means – and the use of Taiwan’s internal contradictions to stoke polarization – has so far achieved certain results for Beijing.
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The role of the U.S.
Washington has long pursued a policy of strategic ambiguity toward Taiwan, meaning it does not indicate exactly how it would respond if Beijing were to attack Taiwan. Facing the upcoming November election, both the Democrats and former President Donald Trump are competing to sound tough on Taiwan.
President Biden has made it clear that the U.S. will not stand idly by should Beijing attack Taiwan. Admiral Samuel Paparo, the new commander of the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, outlined during the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore a “hellscape” response scenario by the U.S. military in the event of an invasion of Taiwan by the PLA. Although there have sometimes been harsh voices, the Biden administration has generally preferred to stick to strategic ambiguity, with a continued arming of Taiwan becoming the White House’s preferred option. The Pentagon recently established the Taiwan Advanced Integration Team to help Taipei get the weapons and military assistance it needs more quickly. So far, President Biden has implemented 15 arms sales to Taiwan since 2021 to strengthen its defenses.
At the same time, the U.S. government is also clearly putting pressure on Mr. Lai to avoid excessive expressions of “Taiwanese independence.” As U.S. House of Representatives Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman Michael McCaul has warned, Beijing’s one-China policy has “certain red lines” that should not be crossed, even if U.S. policy does not recognize Chinese sovereignty over Taiwan.
Scenarios
Beijing will generally not use force until it has exhausted its gray tactics and other means of creating divisions in Taiwan. Of course, these methods are backed by military power. Neither Taiwan nor the U.S. seem to have effective countermeasures to China’s approach. The biggest challenge for President Lai is to adjust his relationship with Taiwanese opposition parties to deal with the mainland’s tactics. Assuming that Beijing will persist in using such gray methods against the Lai government over the next several years, three scenarios are relevant.
More likely: KMT triumph
One is that President Lai allows the pro-China factions among the KMT and the TPP to grow in power in the Legislative Yuan to the point where the function of the Executive Yuan is objectively paralyzed. In this scenario, the KMT wins the next round of elections and will secure governing power.
More likely: Domestic compromise
In a second scenario, Mr. Lai quickly learns to deal with the opposition parties and manages to compromise. At the same time, he effectively solves domestic problems (such as in housing and energy) and, in doing so, eases the relationship with China, allowing Taiwan to buy time.
Less likely: Tensions exacerbate within the next four years
A third outcome would see China start to impose sanctions on the so-called “Taiwan Independents” and use the pro-China fraction of the KMT to further polarize Taiwanese society, which also suffers from the KMT’s own incompetence. As a result, cross-Strait relations become extremely tense, leading to military action.
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