ASEAN still torn over security challenges
The Association of Southeast Asian Nations has been severely tested in recent years, and has failed to rise to the occasion.
In a nutshell
- ASEAN’s divisions weaken its stance on regional security
- Member states differ on responses to the Myanmar coup and China
- Effectiveness is hampered by the bloc’s non-binding diplomatic approach
The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) is currently faced with several pressing issues: the ongoing civil unrest in Myanmar following the 2021 military coup, maritime disputes with China in the South China Sea, and the broader United States-China rivalry. The bloc’s ability to effectively address these and other geopolitical challenges is about to be seriously tested, especially given the diverging views of its member states.
ASEAN was established in 1967 by five founding members: Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand and the Philippines. It subsequently expanded with Brunei joining in 1983, Vietnam in 1995, Myanmar and Laos in 1997 and Cambodia in 1999. In 2022, Timor-Leste was granted official observer status and “in-principle approval” to become a full member. The association seeks to foster peace and economic growth in the region. In recent years, given the complex regional dynamics, security has taken precedence over economic concerns.
ASEAN centrality, a concept stating that the group should be “the driving force behind the evolving regional architecture of the Asia-Pacific area,” was designed to be an important feature of the bloc. The principle was first laid out in the 2008 ASEAN Charter, which states that the organization should be the primary instrument when dealing with external partners and that, to function effectively, the member states need to be united.
Confronting Myanmar’s military regime
In February 2021, Myanmar’s army ousted the elected government of Aung San Suu Kyi, who was detained along with other leaders of her National League for Democracy. The junta’s leader, Senior General Min Aung Hlaing justified the detentions by citing fraudulent allegations during the general election. Meanwhile, Myanmar’s election commission rejected the military’s fraud allegations. The U.S.-based Carter Center, from which a total of 43 observers visited over 200 polling stations in 10 states and regions, also disputed his claim, stating that no major irregularities occurred on election day. Over 4,000 people, mostly civilians, have been killed in the crackdown following the coup.
The crisis in Myanmar triggered international reactions, including from other ASEAN member states. The bloc has been chaired by four countries since the coup: Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia and Laos. None have been successful in resolving the crisis. Three years later, a consensus on how to proceed has proven elusive.
The ASEAN founding members have brought up misgivings over the military takeover in Myanmar. Indonesia called for restraint and a dialogue to find solutions. Singapore adopted the same stance, voicing grave concern and hope that all parties involved would work toward a peaceful outcome. Malaysia and the Philippines have echoed these sentiments.
In contrast, Thailand, through Deputy Prime Minister Prawit Wongsuwon flatly described the coup as an internal matter. Newer members generally share Bangkok’s sentiment.
Five months after the coup, the divisions within ASEAN were made clear when the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution calling for a return to democracy. Only six members voted in favor of the resolution: Indonesia, Singapore, Malaysia, Vietnam, the Philippines and Myanmar itself, which was represented by an ambassador from the overthrown civilian government. The then-ASEAN Chair Brunei, as well as Cambodia, Laos and Thailand all abstained.
ASEAN’s differing political systems likely contributed to the split responses to Myanmar’s coup and the ongoing unrest. Only three members – Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines – are considered to have democratic systems.
Prior to its admission to ASEAN, Myanmar was under the oppressive military regime known as the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) for decades. The U.S. and some European Union member states accused SLORC of human rights violations. ASEAN countries engaged with Myanmar in the hope that regional cooperative efforts and progressive exposure to the market economy would boost regional security and socioeconomic development. Despite objections from the U.S., Myanmar was ultimately admitted to the association.
In April 2021, nine ASEAN member states and the head of the Myanmar junta, Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, agreed on the Five-Point Consensus (FPC), which calls for an immediate cessation of violence in the country; constructive dialogue among all parties to seek a peaceful solution; appointment of a special ASEAN envoy; and humanitarian assistance from the organization. However, the junta has neglected to implement the agreement and the nationwide crackdown on those opposed to military rule continues to this day.
Unlike the West, which imposed sanctions on Myanmar, ASEAN leaders unanimously decided to maintain communication channels with the junta, carefully balancing engagement without legitimizing the military regime.
In October 2021, the 10 member states had an emergency virtual meeting and decided to ban Myanmar from attending the that year’s ASEAN Summit, because the junta backtracked on allowing ASEAN’s special envoy to meet jailed leader Aung San Suu Kyi. Despite the military government’s lack of commitment to any substantive efforts made by ASEAN leaders, suspending the membership of Myanmar has not been raised. The group has no mechanism of expulsion, nor any specific mention about expelling its members when there is non-compliance of the bloc’s charter.
Read more about ASEAN
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- Philippine statecraft navigates Chinese aggression and the U.S. alliance
- South China Sea: Chinese encroachment unites neighbors
Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen was criticized by ASEAN fellow members Indonesia and Malaysia during his tenure as ASEAN chair in 2022. His visit to Myanmar undermined the group’s agreement to withhold recognition of the junta until it showed cooperation.
As the ASEAN chair in 2023, Indonesia set up a special envoy’s office headed by its foreign minister, Retno Marsudi. This approach differed from that of the previous two chairs, Brunei and Cambodia, who appointed special envoys to Myanmar. Jakarta opted for quiet diplomacy, avoiding publicizing every diplomatic move and maintaining that Myanmar would have no representation at ASEAN meetings – except for non-political engagements – until progress was made on the FPC. However, the junta ignored Indonesia’s call for dialogue, and given ASEAN’s non-interference principle preventing punitive measures, no further action was taken.
During Indonesia’s tenure as chair, Thailand and five other member states independently held talks with the military regime, which Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore strongly opposed.
Laos, which is chairing the organization in 2024, appointed a veteran diplomat, Alounkeo Kittikhoun, as envoy. He paid a visit to Myanmar to meet with the head of the ruling military council and other top officials in mid-January, like Cambodia’s playbook during its chairmanship in 2022. This inconsistency in dealing with the junta makes clear the bloc’s inability to present a united stance.
ASEAN and the South China Sea
As with the Myanmar crisis, ASEAN members are similarly divided over Chinese encroachment in the South China Sea.
The hope is that the South China Sea Code of Conduct – an agreement aimed at managing disputes by setting rules for activities like resource exploration and military exercises in the contested waters – will have more impact than the non-binding document signed by ASEAN and China in 2002. However, it is still unclear whether the document will be legally enforceable. Despite over two decades of negotiations, divisions within ASEAN remain. Countries like Vietnam and the Philippines, frequently involved in confrontations with China, want a binding agreement, while China-aligned nations, such as Cambodia and Laos, are more hesitant.
With China claiming nearly the entire South China Sea, another issue is determining which geographical areas the Code of Conduct should cover and securing agreement from all parties involved.
Recently, China and the Philippines clashed again near Sabina Shoal, located 630 miles from the Chinese coast. Both sides accused each other of ramming vessels, marking the fifth incident in a month. This escalation followed a recent de-escalation effort where both countries agreed to allow Manila to resupply its outpost at Second Thomas Shoal. China continues to pursue its claims aggressively in the disputed waters, openly disregarding a 2016 international tribunal ruling that invalidated its legal claims. Tensions have been rising since last year, raising concerns about the potential for a larger confrontation.
Facts & figures
Public opinion shifts in ASEAN countries
In a speech at this year’s Shangri-La Dialogue, Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. condemned growing assertiveness in the South China Sea, indirectly referring to China. He warned that the death of a Filipino citizen through a deliberate act would be considered close to an act of war. Mr. Marcos hinted that Manila might invoke the 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty with the U.S., expressing confidence that the U.S. shares the same view. The agreement requires both nations to defend each other in the event of an attack by a third party.
In 2012, for the first time since its founding, ASEAN foreign ministers failed to issue a joint communique due to Cambodia blocking consensus over tensions in the disputed waters. At the time, Cambodian leader Hun Sen argued that such issues should be addressed bilaterally, aligning with China’s preference. These fractures resurfaced during July’s post-ministerial meeting in Vientiane, where host nations Laos and Cambodia opposed wording in the communique that would condemn a Chinese coast guard vessel involved in a June collision with a Philippine resupply boat.
Scenarios
More likely: Divisions with ASEAN grow more pronounced
At next month’s ASEAN Summit, member states are expected to remain divided over the Myanmar crisis. Some support strong criticism of the military government’s failure to commit to the Five-Point Consensus, rising violence, and its decision to once again postpone the general election, now scheduled for 2025. Others advocate a softer approach.
Malaysia, set to hold the rotating chair next year, may change the bloc’s approach to regional issues. Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim has expressed his intention to push for a more assertive and dynamic strategy to address the Myanmar crisis, one that includes political engagement with all relevant stakeholders in the country.
ASEAN members are also split on how to respond to China’s increasingly aggressive actions in the South China Sea, particularly against the Philippines. Negotiations with China over the South China Sea Code of Conduct are scheduled to conclude within two years, but resolution remains difficult. Not all ASEAN members have territorial disputes with China, making consensus hard to achieve. This disunity could weaken the bloc’s negotiating position and allow Beijing to exploit divisions within the group.
Less likely: More decisive approach to regional issues
It is unlikely that China will agree to a legally binding Code of Conduct in the South China Sea, given its increasingly assertive actions in the disputed waters. Incidents involving water cannons, vessel ramming and the construction of artificial islands with military facilities continue despite the unenforceable Declaration on the Conduct of Parties, in which all parties agreed to resolve disputes peacefully and refrain from escalating activities. More importantly, China has openly rejected the 2016 international tribunal ruling that invalidated its claims, deeming it null and void.
ASEAN, founded on a declaration rather than a treaty, serves as a platform for dialogue on regional security aimed at maintaining peace and stability. It follows the “ASEAN Way” of diplomacy, characterized by consultation, consensus, peaceful dispute resolution and a preference for non-binding, non-legalistic approaches. As a result, the likelihood of the Code of Conduct becoming a legally binding agreement is slim.
Moreover, ASEAN lacks a military force, which diminishes its diplomatic influence as it cannot back its decisions with enforcement capabilities.
Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim, speaking on the sidelines of Nikkei’s Future of Asia Summit in Tokyo, emphasized that Malaysia’s priorities as ASEAN chair in 2025 will focus on the economy, trade and investment. Malaysia’s recent decision to join the China-led BRICS bloc suggests its approach to the South China Sea dispute next year is unlikely to be confrontational toward China.
ASEAN’s chairmanship rotates annually, but as seen with Indonesia’s term, which had the experience of transitioning from authoritarian rule to democracy, a single year is rarely enough to make significant progress on complex issues like the Myanmar crisis. Consequently, the chances of any ASEAN chair playing a decisive role in resolving the crisis are low.
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