Venezuela: Maduro’s totalitarian turn
Nicolas Maduro’s disputed win over Edmundo Gonzalez deepens Venezuela’s alignment with authoritarian regimes, triggering protests and repression.
In a nutshell
- Electoral fraud is fueling widespread protests and international isolation
- Maduro is consolidating power through repression of the opposition
- Autocrats support Maduro, while most democratic nations reject his claims
In an egregious example of electoral fraud, incumbent Nicolas Maduro claimed victory in Venezuela’s July 28 presidential elections, refusing to concede defeat to opposition candidate Edmundo Gonzalez Urrutia. Despite independent analyses putting Mr. Gonzalez’s share of the vote above 65 percent, the incumbent government has left no question about the nature of its regime, refusing to release vote tallies, imprisoning opposition political organizers and supporters, and censoring social media. As a result, Mr. Maduro appears poised to hang onto power through the help of the state security apparatus, a compliant judiciary and international authoritarian allies like Russia and China. The actions further isolate the Latin American country, likely spurring more economic uncertainty and emigration.
The Maduro administration stacks the deck
The election and its immediate aftermath represented one of the clearest opportunities for a transition to democracy since national protests and an attempted interim government in 2019. After years of political apathy under Mr. Maduro’s authoritarian thumb, opposition leader Maria Corina Machado of the Plataforma Unitaria Democratica (Democratic Unitary Platform, PUD) captured the popular imagination and galvanized voters.
Although the government banned her from holding office, her management of the diverse coalition was instrumental in uniting Venezuelans of all backgrounds behind replacement candidate, Mr. Gonzalez. Ms. Machado toured the country by car and campaigned in front of massive crowds of supporters ahead of the polls, while Mr. Maduro spoke at half-empty rallies. Unlike in past elections, the PUD this time also prepared a defense against an expected lack of electoral transparency, training more than 90,000 election watchers to monitor polling stations in units known as comanditos.
Still, it was clear that the government would not make things easy. In the months preceding the election, state security forces imprisoned opposition political operators and members of civil society and also revoked an invitation for a European Union electoral observation mission. Local authorities stacked the deck in favor of Mr. Maduro, creating a confusing ballot that favored him while reducing the number of ballot boxes in polling stations to slow voting and complicate monitoring. On election day, the PUD denounced the expulsion of comanditos from voting stations. Nevertheless, the opposition’s preparation paid off, as participation far exceeded expectations.
Despite this optimism, with 80 percent of the votes counted in the early hours of July 29, Elvis Amoroso, the head of Venezuela’s National Electoral Council, declared Mr. Maduro the winner of the election with 51.2 percent versus 44.2 percent for Mr. Gonzalez. No proof nor disaggregated data from the polling stations were provided, in a departure from the Council’s procedure in every previous presidential election. This questionable result was then ratified by the Maduro-friendly Supreme Court.
These tallies show that Mr. Maduro won just 30 percent of the vote, compared with 67 percent for Mr. Gonzalez.
The PUD and several foreign governments almost immediately dismissed the results as fraudulent, and set out to show the world the scale of the Venezuelan government’s electoral manipulation. Opposition activists gathered, scanned and uploaded more than 83 percent of the voting tallies to a publicly available website that displayed the overall results and the outcomes of individual polling stations. These tallies show that Mr. Maduro won just 30 percent of the vote, compared with 67 percent for Mr. Gonzalez. Subsequent independent analyses carried out by election forensics professors and political scientists, as well as the Associated Press, the Washington Post and the Colombian NGO Mision de Observacion Electoral, have verified the opposition’s calculations and the scale of the fraud. An Organization of American States report noted the technical and legal irregularities, while the Carter Center declared that “the electoral authority’s failure to announce disaggregated results by polling station constitutes a serious breach of electoral principles.”
The aftermath of Venezuela’s vote
Protests began spreading across the country almost immediately as Venezuelans took to the streets to peacefully object to the Electoral Council’s claims of a Maduro victory. Unlike anti-government action in prior years, these demonstrations and cacerolazos (pot-and-pan-banging protests) were not restricted to just wealthy areas – they also took place in working-class neighborhoods that had long been bastions of support for the Chavista government. In several places, crowds even toppled statues of the late former president and strongman Hugo Chavez (1999-2013) out of anger.
The government in Caracas, meanwhile, defied international pressure to publish the full results, and moved to crack down on protestors and suppress dissent by deploying the National Guard, the National Intelligence Service (SEBIN) and pro-government paramilitary colectivos. These groups rounded up and arrested hundreds of protesters and went after opposition political figures, even kidnapping PUD politicians Freddy Superlano and Maria Oropeza, pulling the former out of his SUV by armed and hooded figures, and taking the latter from her home by military counterintelligence.
Still more damaging to opposition unity, a Venezuelan judge issued an arrest warrant for the ostensible presidential victor, Mr. Gonzalez, on September 2. The warrant accused him of several crimes, including usurpation of functions, forging public documents, inciting lawbreaking, conspiracy, sabotage and criminal association. Faced with the possibility of life imprisonment, the 75 year-old Gonzalez instead sought exile in Spain later that week, weakening his ability to contest the electoral outcome.
There was also rapid geopolitical fallout. Latin American governments of Argentina, Chile, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, Panama, Peru and Uruguay questioned the election results. In response, the Maduro administration expelled their diplomatic staff, showing its refusal to accept criticism and willingness to isolate itself. Conversely, the only countries worldwide to officially recognize Mr. Maduro as the winner were the authoritarian or hybrid regimes in Bolivia, Cuba, Honduras, Nicaragua, China, Guinea-Bissau, Iran, Russia, Serbia and Syria, emphasizing the global divide between democracies and dictatorships.
Overwhelmingly, most international efforts – including those from the left-leaning governments of Brazil, Colombia and Mexico, as well as the United Nations – have focused on pushing Mr. Maduro to publish full electoral results from each polling station. His government, however, has remained unmoved, arguing implausibly that the Electoral Council had been hacked by a foreign actor. Mr. Gonzalez’s exit from the country appears to have quieted the urgency of these foreign government efforts.
Since the election, Mr. Maduro has cracked down even harder on civil society, further intensifying media censorship and relaunching Operacion Tun Tun (Operation Knock Knock), a massive campaign of persecution directed against opponents, social leaders and protesters. As part of this crackdown, the government launched a webpage, a WhatsApp number and an app that allows users to anonymously report neighbors or acquaintances for so-called subversive activity, such as attending protests, posting statements critical of the government on social media, or even criticizing the government verbally.
According to Venezuelan NGO Provea, the government arbitrarily detained more than 2,400 people in the 16 days following the election, including hundreds of children, while the disproportionate use of force and coordination between security forces and paramilitary groups left dozens dead. Provea also recorded at least 50 cases of forced disappearances, in which victims were illegally detained by security forces and paramilitary groups, often without their families having any information about their whereabouts. In Mr. Maduro’s Venezuela, detainees are not granted procedural guarantees: Most are denied access to both lawyers and family visits, and then they are swiftly sentenced in virtual hearings.
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The Maduro regime apparently is also detaining foreign nationals. The governments of the U.S., Spain and the Czech Republic said that their citizens were arrested on trumped-up charges and are being held by the regime without access to lawyers, family or contact with their respective governments.
The government has also attacked the media. On August 7, the Venezuelan Press Workers Union said that four members of the press had been charged with terrorism offences since the election and had been denied access to a defense lawyer. Mr. Maduro has also gone after social media, one of the few remaining spaces for consuming news in Venezuela. On August 8, the president ordered a 10-day ban on access to the social media platform X in an attempt to blunt public criticism and hinder opposition coordination.
Where does Venezuela go from here?
The Maduro government sought international legitimacy that comes with winning elections. However, it appears to have severely underestimated support for the opposition and overestimated support for its own candidate. It is clear that Chavismo has lost its popular mandate: the opposition’s vote tallies show that the ruling party’s supporters in the public sector and poor neighborhoods have largely abandoned Mr. Maduro. In this context, he and his allies can only retain power by force, through control of the country’s institutions and with the support of state security forces.
Facts & figures
What is Chavismo?
Chavismo, also known as Chavism, is a left-wing political ideology based on the populist ideas, programs and government style associated with the Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez (1999-2013). It blends elements of democratic socialism, socialist patriotism and Latin American integration. Those who supported Hugo Chavez and Chavismo are known as Chavistas.
A combination of international pressure and domestic protest could still lead to a democratic transition, but many factors would have to come together for this to become a reality. Further diminishing the chances of a democratic turnaround, Mr. Gonzalez’s exile to Spain actually aids Mr. Maduro: The government avoids the fallout that would have ensued had it imprisoned Mr. Gonzalez and forcibly removed the sole opposition politician who could claim a democratic mandate. Additionally, on September 18, the exiled Mr. Gonzalez said he was coerced into signing a document recognizing Mr. Maduro as the election winner.
The economic blowback is uncertain but mounting. The United States Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control has already issued sanctions against 16 Venezuelan officials. The PUD has called on the U.S. to cancel the licenses that allow Chevron and other energy companies to operate in Venezuela. Nonetheless, the U.S. may be caught in a lose-lose situation, as rescinding these licenses risks exacerbating the country’s economic crisis and would likely fuel an increase in Venezuelan emigration during an election season in the U.S.
It is too early to tell how these scenarios might affect Venezuela’s 2025 elections to select new national legislators, regional governors and municipal mayors.
Scenarios
Most likely: Consolidated rule and a totalitarian turn
The most likely outcome is that Mr. Maduro survives and maintains his grip on power, further deepening his regime’s authoritarianism and joining the ranks of some of the world’s most ruthless dictators. He is again counting on being able to use dilatory tactics to delay legal proceedings and wait out the domestic and international opposition, in the same way he survived previous waves of protest, contentious elections and attempted ousters. Mr. Maduro will also continue to use the tools of repression and censorship that have made his regime increasingly totalitarian, where the government seeks to control and punish even private criticism. Venezuelan citizens will enjoy few freedoms.
This outcome is possible through the continued support of the military as well as the limited capacity of the international community to influence the government. Over his 11 years in power, Mr. Maduro has systematically coup-proofed his government, intermittently purging senior civilian and military leaders, surrounding himself with loyalists and tying his survival to that of other senior leaders and a cadre of high-ranking military officers. In exchange, the military high command has repeatedly demonstrated its fealty to him, while surveillance from the military’s counterintelligence agency (DGCIM) frustrates defections from junior officers.
Foreign pressure from democratic countries, meanwhile, has been offset by support from authoritarian allies Russia, China, Cuba and Iran, all of which have provided loans, commerce and security assistance to Venezuela in recent years. Venezuela will move closer to these countries, and even further away from the democracies of all ideological stripes in the Americas.
One effect of this will be deepening international isolation and economic instability. As from 2018-2023, non-allies will likely reimpose sanctions as a punitive measure, deepening Venezuela’s financial crisis as well as Mr. Maduro’s reliance on criminal networks, illegal mining and contraband trafficking to preserve access to rents. This, in turn, will create a high-risk, long-term scenario for investors. In essence, there is little chance of permanent economic recovery without the robust international investment and trade that comes with legitimacy of governance.
The repressive environment will also trigger the emigration of hundreds of thousands of people, further challenging the region’s capacity to manage and integrate these displaced individuals. Prior to the elections, one poll indicated that as many as 40 percent of Venezuelans would consider leaving the country if Mr. Maduro remained in power. Neighboring Colombia, whose infrastructure for receiving Venezuelans has been allowed to deteriorate under the government of Gustavo Petro (2022-present), is particularly ill-quipped to receive more Venezuelans.
In short, the most likely outcome is one with serious humanitarian, economic and geopolitical consequences.
Possible: An involuntary exit
Without the possibility of institutional transfers of power (such as free and fair elections), the most common way in which dictators vacate power is through violence: either a military coup or a civilian “palace coup.” Mr. Maduro’s coup-proofing has ensured that neither of these possibilities has come to fruition, so far. However, redistributing rents to allies and keeping the military high command unified and satisfied indefinitely becomes more difficult in times of economic scarcity and international opprobrium.
In this scenario, allies of Mr. Maduro begin to reconsider their position sometime after he is again sworn in as president in January 2025, deciding that the benefits from continued repression are not worth the costs imposed by the international community, from economic restrictions to geopolitical isolation. With Mr. Maduro’s involuntary exit, actors such as Defense Minister Vladimir Padrino Lopez and Operational Strategic Commander Domingo Hernandez Lares would lead a group of senior commanders to force Mr. Maduro from office. This, of course, is predicated on sustained pressure from the international community, as well as continued organization and clear messaging from Ms. Machado and the Venezuelan opposition.
Such a change, however, would not necessarily lead to democracy. In fact, most coups do not lead to democratic governments, but to more dictatorships. The coup leaders could plausibly hand over the reins to the PUD’s Gonzalez, but it is more likely that they would choose another Chavista leader who would be expected to protect their interests.
Replacing one dictatorship with another would not substantially change patterns of limited foreign investment, economic sanctions or migration, at least in the short term.
Possible: A slow transition through power-sharing
Sustained domestic and international pressure to support a negotiated transition to democracy could still be successful, however, especially if sustained human rights abuses and other excesses push key members of Mr. Maduro’s coalition to defect and survive. This general outcome, which could take the form of a unity government or a (less likely) transition to a strictly opposition government, would be a welcome outcome for Venezuela’s citizens, the region and the country’s future, to say nothing of global democratic forces.
Any possibility of a transition would require a negotiated off-ramp for Mr. Maduro and his allies, in particular immunity from prosecution or amnesty, guarantees of stability for the military and offers of asylum. This provides a semi-dignified exit for Mr. Maduro which also allows senior figures to protect at least some of their interests.
This is most likely to come about via some type of power-sharing arrangement, like the temporary coalition government floated by Brazilian President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva and Colombia’s Mr. Petro. Like Colombia’s National Front, a government from 1958-1974 in which the Conservative and Liberal parties agreed to rotate power to stabilize the country, or Zimbabwe’s Government of National Unity formed in 2009, this government would include members of both Chavismo as well as the PUD. They would co-govern by dividing responsibilities within the executive branch and jointly devising a plan to address the country’s many crises.
Economically, any type of transitional government with some legitimacy would reignite both growth and foreign direct investment, especially in the oil industry, while drawing back at least some of the 8 million Venezuelans who have emigrated in the past two decades. In terms of geopolitics, it would further isolate Cuba and Nicaragua, and remove one of Russia’s chief allies in the region.
To date, behind-the-scenes diplomatic efforts to secure a negotiated exit, reportedly being led by the U.S., Colombia, Mexico and Brazil, appear to have stalled. Nonetheless, an exit through the construction of a power-sharing agreement is not off the table.
Least likely: Conflict approaching civil war
The least likely scenario is one of protracted civil conflict. On one hand, Venezuela meets several preconditions for low intensity internal conflict, including widespread social, political and economic grievances, government repression of those grievances, and a low sense of statehood in both rural and urban areas. However, the government and its allies possess a near-monopoly on arms, making this scenario only a remote possibility – opposition groups would first have to obtain firepower to wage a civil conflict against the state. Such a scenario, of course, would be economically devastating and cause further regional turmoil. Instead, the groups currently most able to confront the government are non-state armed actors, such as colectivos, gangs and groups engaged in illegal mining, most of whom are geographically isolated and would be motivated by economic goals rather than political ones.
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