A new Monroe Doctrine for the Western Hemisphere?
The concept of hemispheric defense may gain new traction in the U.S. if Donald Trump is elected, but finding willing partners is uncertain.
In a nutshell
- The Monroe Doctrine once defined South America as a U.S. security zone
- China and Russia have brought geopolitical competition to that continent
- A Trump administration may revive the idea of hemispheric defense
The United States is embroiled in global competition with China, Iran and Russia, powers seeking to expand their influence in the Western Hemisphere and undermine U.S. interests. The American response will hinge on the outcome of the country’s national elections in November. If Donald Trump wins, the U.S. could well resurrect a version of the American grand strategy known as the Monroe Doctrine that focuses U.S. attention to its own hemisphere. If President Joe Biden is reelected, the administration will reject this idea and continue its current policies in the region.
A rejuvenation of the Monroe Doctrine could present significant challenges to Washington. Winning support from international partners would consume additional diplomatic, economic and security resources at a time when American interests also require a bolder presence in the Middle East, Europe and Asia. This shift would demand closer cooperation and resource allocation with European and Asia-Pacific partners who engage in Latin American affairs.
Hemispheric defense creed
American President James Monroe (1817-1825) enunciated his doctrine in an 1823 address to Congress. It declared that the U.S. would oppose both colonialism in the Western Hemisphere and interference by foreign powers in the newly independent states in Latin America.
Though the U.S. continued to impose itself in regional affairs to safeguard its security interests, the allegiance to and invocation of the Monroe Doctrine faded.
In the 19th century, the U.S. lacked the capacity to implement this policy. Still, the doctrine reflected a shift in American grand strategy that endured throughout World War II, whereby the U.S. saw hemispheric defense as the primary means of protecting U.S. vital interests. Even the U.S. entry into World War I was justified as preemptively addressing the threat from the German Empire before it could project power into the Western Hemisphere. Debates around U.S. strategy during World War II, prior to the December 7, 1941, Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, revolved around the concept of hemispheric defense.
After World War II, the U.S. became a superpower with global interests and responsibilities. Though it continued to impose itself in regional affairs to safeguard its security interests, the allegiance to and invocation of the Monroe Doctrine faded. The 1979 U.S. surrender of the control of the Panama Canal under the Torrijos-Carter Treaties reflected a decisive shift in policy focus. U.S. interventions returned to prominence under President Ronald Reagan, but the Western Hemisphere continued to decline as a focus of strategic interest with the end of the Cold War.
Catalysts for change
While Russia, China and Iran’s influence in the hemisphere has been expanding for years, three developments have triggered a reconsideration of a more muscular theater strategy.
The first is the U.S. border and immigration situation. The policies of President Joe Biden have resulted in unprecedented levels of illegal migration into the U.S., including more significant migrant flows from Asia, the Middle East and Africa. Border and immigration policies have a substantial impact on regional affairs and, consequently, have become a significant issue in the upcoming national elections. If President Biden wins reelection, electoral success will mitigate pressure for forceful shifts in policy. In contrast, if former President Donald Trump is elected, there will be dramatic policy reversals.
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The second is the Sao Paolo Forum, also known as the Foro de Sao Paulo. Launched in 1990 in Brazil, it is today an assemblage of left-wing parties and organizations, mainly from Latin America and the Caribbean. Its like-minded leaders, particularly in Cuba, Venezuela, Nicaragua and Bolivia, all have close and expanding relations with China, Russia and Iran. The forum formulates increasingly active and aggressive policies to undermine pro-U.S. regimes in the region and accepts transnational crime, including networks from the Middle East, as a helpful tool for destabilization. These governments promote socialist and communist policies that are anathema to conservative Americans.
The third challenge to Washington is that Latin America already considers the U.S. efforts to address “root causes” of endemic challenges in the region (poverty, crime, corruption, human rights abuses and declining democracy) and the Los Angeles Declaration on Migration and Protection (June 2022) as abject failures.
The new Trump administration could well seek a bold policy shift to signal a new direction focusing on regional strategy.
It is not only the presidential candidates and their teams that embrace contrasting visions for hemispheric versus global policy, reviving in some ways the old hemispheric defense concept. Both contestants have significant political allies who share their views. For example, two of Mr. Trump’s strongest supporters in the U.S. Senate, Marco Rubio and Ted Cruz, have strong views on Latin America policies and are less supportive of U.S. engagement in Ukraine, as do important Republican governors, including Greg Abbott of Texas and Ron DeSantis of Florida. In addition, key policy advisors to watch if Mr. Trump returns to the White House include Roger Noriega, former U.S. assistant secretary of state for Western Hemisphere Affairs, and Christopher Landau, former U.S. ambassador to Mexico. All these influential figures would press for a rethink of hemispheric and global policies.
Scenarios
If Donald Trump wins
A pivot to Latin America becomes likely. The new Trump administration could well seek a bold policy shift to signal a new direction focusing on regional strategy. The concept of the Monroe Doctrine resonates with many of Mr. Trump’s conservative supporters. Further, Mr. Trump has not been averse to grasping labels that enthuse his supporters – even if they have a complicated history. Former President Trump demonstrated this in his adoption of “America First,” the moniker of the pre-World War II U.S. isolationist movement, as the bumper sticker for his foreign policy.
Just as Mr. Trump’s contemporary America First agenda in practice did not adopt isolationist policies, a Trump version of the Monroe Doctrine would likely not implement policies identical to those in the 19th and early 20th centuries that formed the hemispheric defense concept, when the U.S. imposed regional hegemony on Latin America. Instead, a new Monroe Doctrine in practice would comprise partnerships between the U.S. and like-minded nations in the region that share common goals, such as mitigating the influence of Russia, China and Iran, and stemming irregular migration. These goals would also reject the Sao Paulo Forum agenda and foster traditional values with regards to life, family, gender, religion and cultural issues.
There would likely be three components of a Trump version of the Monroe Doctrine.
One: Be a better friend to your friends. The U.S. would likely seek to immediately strengthen bilateral relationships with governments in the hemisphere that share similar agendas, such as Argentina and Paraguay. Regional partners would, in turn, look for more significant foreign direct investment from the U.S.
Two: Be tougher on your enemies. U.S. policies toward Cuba, Venezuela and Bolivia, in particular, would harden.
Three: “Tough love” for regional regimes that are strategically important but are governed by leaders who do not subscribe to Mr. Trump’s conservative agenda. These would include Brazil, Colombia, Guatemala and Mexico.
This scenario is rather demanding for the U.S. The nations in the region that seek to partner with the U.S. would be looking for more investment, security cooperation and enhanced diplomatic engagement. The U.S. is already trying to hold its position in the challenging environments of the Middle East and Europe while seeking to enlarge its footprint in the Indo-Pacific region. These realities would make it challenging for Washington to find resources to deliver more in Latin America. Hindered by previous unkept U.S. promises, enthusiasm for a new Monroe Doctrine would quickly fizzle unless tangible benefits arrived.
One way for Washington to contribute more to reclaiming primacy in the Western Hemisphere could be a joint effort with friends and allies from Europe and Asia-Pacific. The U.S., however, currently lacks the governmental structures and institutions to operationalize such cooperation. The transatlantic partnership virtually ignores relations south of the equator, though Argentina is trying to change that. The focus of the Quad (U.S., India, Japan and Australia), the most significant collaboration in the Indo-Pacific, looks mostly west to Asia and the Indian Ocean, not to the eastern Pacific and Latin America.
There is scant evidence the Trump team has thought through the means to deliver a new hemispheric doctrine without undercutting U.S. engagement elsewhere in any detail.
If a Democrat is elected
The Biden team (or another Democratic administration) would reject a return to the Monroe Doctrine, arguing it has imperialistic overtones and ignores other areas of U.S. interest. A second Biden administration is more likely to repackage past initiatives and present them as fresh ideas, including the president’s alliance for democracy, the green transition initiative and his administration’s determination to address the “root causes” stymieing regional development.
Wild cards
Several issues could preempt how the next administration engages in the Western Hemisphere. One of the most significant factors would be if Venezuela initiates military action against Guyana. Bolivia’s increasing strategic partnership with Iran and China could also trigger shifts in U.S. policy. A major terrorist attack on U.S. soil would force a future U.S. administration to take drastic action, especially if it originated in the Western Hemisphere.
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